



miami-dade election reform coalition

FINAL REPORT

GET IT RIGHT THE FIRST TIME
Poll Closing Observation,
Ballot Accounting, and Electronic Voting Security

**A study of the November 2, 2004 General Election
in Miami-Dade County, Florida**

MIAMI-DADE ELECTION REFORM COALITION

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www.reformcoalition.org
4500 Biscayne Blvd., Suite 340 Miami, FL 33137

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I. INTRODUCTION

During November 2004, the Miami–Dade Election Reform Coalition (MDERC, or “the Coalition”)¹ organized non–partisan, all–volunteer observers to monitor procedures at selected polling places on Election–day and at early voting sites.² The early voting and Election–day monitoring was supplemented by an extensive review of thousands of pages of public documents, obtained from County government bodies through numerous public records requests.³ The two parts of this study together are the subject of this report.

This project did not attempt a comprehensive audit of Miami–Dade’s election procedures, security, ballot accounting, or vote–counting.⁴

Rather, the purpose of the poll closing observation project was twofold. First, by involving non–partisan citizen volunteers in the monitoring of early voting and Election–day poll closing procedures, the project sought to increase civic participation in the conduct of elections and to spread community awareness of the importance of the public’s involvement in monitoring the most basic workings of our democratic system. Second, the project sought to assess the transparency (the ability of the public to see what goes on in elections) and the accuracy of the system of vote gathering and vote counting in Miami–Dade County during the November 2004 general election.

The findings of the Coalition, which are set forth more fully below, indicate that during the November election, the County experienced serious problems with policies and procedures that are supposed to protect the integrity of the ballot count. For example, in a large number of precincts, the number of persons who signed in to vote

¹The Miami–Dade Election Reform Coalition (MDERC) is a non–partisan grass–roots organization dedicated to election reform. Our mission is to protect the rights of every eligible voter to cast a ballot and to have that ballot accurately recorded and counted.

² Throughout early voting and on Election–day, volunteers observed a total of 88 separate poll closings. During the two weeks of early voting, 57 separate closings and several poll openings were observed over 18 of the 20 early voting sites in Miami–Dade County. On Election–day, 31 of 534 poll closings were observed.

³ After the election, we compared the number of ballots counted in each polling place to the forms filled out by poll workers on Election–day listing the number of voters who signed the registers. We looked obtained the records generated during early voting. For both Election–day and early voting, we compared the observations of Project participants with the detailed records in County documents.

⁴ The Project’s methods built on pilot projects tested by the Coalition in elections held in March and August 2004. They are explained in Appendix A of this study, and the documents we developed for observing the polls appear in Appendix I.

was not tracked carefully or was not compared with the number of actual ballots cast. This failing, in one egregious instance in Precinct 816, permitted unintentional ballot stuffing when the votes deposited in one voting machine were added to the total count multiple times, without being detected or corrected. The vote-counting problems experienced in Precinct 816 could have been prevented or corrected if basic procedures had been followed at the precinct.

As detailed below, the Coalition also uncovered problems with access and transparency. Sometimes our observers were welcomed, and sometimes they were excluded. The ability of the public to witness ballot counting at poll closings was inconsistent and largely dependent on the whim of the poll workers who sometimes blocked all access to ballot counting.

Miami-Dade County has made public its inquiry into replacing direct recording electronic voting (DRE) voting machines with optical scan equipment. The problems discussed in this report go beyond the type of voting system used. Any system adopted by the county must be run well. Every system should account for ballots cast by counting the voters.⁵ The ability of the public to see what happens when votes are counted protects the integrity of the election and is vital to public confidence.

Observing polls in Miami-Dade is a challenging but important project. The 2000 census listed Miami-Dade as the eighth largest county in the nation, with a population of 2,253,362; this makes the county larger than seventeen states. In terms of geographic size, the county is larger than Rhode Island and slightly smaller than Delaware. The county's population base is very diverse, with the largest per capita immigrant population in the world.⁶ In November 2004 1,058,799 registered voters could vote on trilingual ballots in English, Spanish and Creole. Voter turnout was 73.6% or 778,953 total ballots cast, according to the official canvass.

The Coalition wishes to thank the volunteers who willingly and unselfishly gave of their time as organizers, observers, researchers and drafters of this report. The poll closing observation project was made possible through a grant from the Verified Voting Foundation.⁷

⁵ In any case, Miami-Dade would continue to use DRE machines for disabled voters, who are entitled to equal voting security.

⁶ On July 16, 2004, a front page article in the Miami Herald reported that a United Nations' study found Miami to have the highest percentage of immigrants calling it home of any large city worldwide.

⁷ For information on Verified Voting Foundation, see www.verifiedvoting.org.

II. WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN AT POLL CLOSINGS IN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY -- COUNT, COMPARE, INVESTIGATE, AND REPORT

Poll closing begins after the last voter has cast a ballot. The polls officially close at 7 p.m., but everyone in line must be allowed to vote. When the last voter finishes, the public can enter to observe the poll closing. The last ballot also triggers the start of closing procedures for the election board, including securing equipment and materials against further voting.

Poll workers should count the number of signatures in the precinct registers, and the clerk should enter the total on a form called Certificate No. 2.⁸ The number of voters is the benchmark to measure the number of ballots that should be tallied. It will be compared to the number of ballots counted on the machines to be sure that both totals are correct.

The vote totals from each machine are used to produce a results tape. The clerk and elections specialist⁹ close the terminals and gather vote totals by putting a “master PEB” device into each machine. A printer connected to the last voting machine produces the results tape.

Each voting machine screen shows a “public count” of the number of ballots cast on that machine; the counter is set to zero at the beginning of each election and goes up by one with every ballot recorded. The results tape first shows both the public count for each machine and a total of the public counts on all the machines. Then the tape reports the total votes for each candidate and question.¹⁰

Discrepancies between the number of voters and the number of ballots counted should be investigated immediately. The signatures may have been counted incorrectly. Mistakes in counting voter signatures should be corrected immediately. If the total number of voters is not correct, there will be no way to tell how many ballots should be there. Problems in electronic vote recording and counting have been found

⁸ Poll workers also utilize the form to verify the packing of election results and equipment and the seal numbers on results and equipment. The form is signed by the clerk and assistant clerk and witnessed by the inspectors. On the same form, the elections specialist and the clerk sign a statement that they will transport the sealed equipment and the results to the collection center.

⁹ In Miami-Dade, a county employee works in every polling place as a technical elections specialist.

¹⁰ If more than one ballot style (the set of candidates and questions) was used in the precinct, the tape shows the “public count” and vote totals separately for each ballot style used in the election.

through investigating discrepancies between the number of voters and the number of ballots.

If the election board cannot reconcile the number of voters with the number of votes, they should report the discrepancy to the canvassing board.¹¹ Equipment cannot be shut down or put away until the poll workers have run the results tapes, counted the number of voters, and accounted for all ballots cast.¹²

The public should be able to witness poll closing proceedings. They should be able to see that all machines are downloaded, that the number of signatures has been compared with the number of ballots cast, and that the results and equipment are sealed and handled securely. The public should also see the results posted at the precinct.

During early voting, voters fill out certificates affirming that they are registered to vote. These paper certificates are the equivalent of signing a precinct register on Election-day. Results are not tabulated during early voting, but the public count of ballots showing on the machines should be verified by comparison to the number of voters. Ballot accounting must be completed at the end of each day of early voting.

Early voting should also be transparent. Members of the public should be able to witness the counting of voter certificates and the public count from the voting machines showing how many ballots had been recorded to date, the resolution of any discrepancies, and the accurate reporting of these totals to the Elections Department. The public should also be able to see that equipment is handled securely.

¹¹ According to a Memo from Supervisor of Elections Lester Sola, reproduced in Appendix G, Miami-Dade currently instructs poll workers to report large discrepancies. For reasons explained in this report, small discrepancies can also be extremely important. See Appendix F, Letter to Secretary of State Glenda Hood, for a discussion of the importance of reporting discrepancies in counties using electronic voting systems and a discussion of current Florida laws and rules.

¹² If some machines are closed too quickly before results are produced and totals verified, it may be difficult to resolve problems if tapes must be re-run or votes re-gathered, or if the data on the machines must be re-checked.

III. FINDINGS:

A. TRACKING VOTER TURNOUT AND ACCOUNTING FOR BALLOTS

1. Early Voting Observations – See Tables 1 and 2

Early voting (EV) proved popular in Miami–Dade County in this election, attracting 244,156 ballots cast, or 31.3% of the total, according to the Elections Department. EV was conducted during the 15 days immediately prior to Election–day, at 20 sites spread across the county. Most sites opened for 14 of the 15 day duration, closing the Sunday before Election–day

Early voting in this election is best understood as one 18–day long Election–day, because the Elections Department set up sites and iVotronics were turned on up to three days before voting began. The machines stayed on for the duration and ballots were only harvested at the end of the final day. In off hours, election workers locked the machines in sleep mode with a password and screen saver. The cases were closed and secured with a numbered seal, but the machines were not turned off until the last day of early voting at each site.

This presented significant security concerns as sites averaged more than 30 machines apiece, for a total of more than 600 machines left on for approximately 400 hours straight, spread over 20 sites. For that duration, machines had to be secured against tampering and malfunction, and election workers had to work long hours in order to staff the sites.

Remarkably little State or County guidance exists for early voting procedures. Most guidance refers to Election–day procedures and does not address the unique security and operational concerns posed by early voting.¹³

Election–day poll closing procedures are based on the election being over, which is never the case during early voting. In early voting, daily poll closings should be regarded as *temporary* closings. Daily ballot accounting should be considered *incremental* ballot accounting. So each day there is a temporary closing where the next increment of ballot accounting is performed. Each increment is just as important as an Election–day ballot accounting because it is the correct time to account for that day’s

¹³ For instance, early voting is not mentioned in the *Florida Polling Place Procedures Manual*, on page 13 under *Ballot Accounting, for counties using touchscreen voting systems*,

ballots by counting ballots and voters, comparing the two numbers, investigating any discrepancies, and reporting any unresolved discrepancies to the canvassing board. This is the time to find and correct any accumulating problems.

Our study found no mention of early voting ballot accounting in county training manuals. Two long-time clerks we interviewed confirmed the poll worker training is focused on collecting the electronic ballots from voting machines but that there is almost no training for counting signatures or certificates, comparing voter counts to vote counts, investigating or reporting discrepancies in early voting using the iVotronic voting system.

Miami-Dade's Early Voting Site Procedures Manual does not mention daily incremental closing procedures at all, and does not mention any electronic ballot accounting procedures for the unique last day of early voting. It mentions collecting electronic ballots but it doesn't discuss electronic ballot accounting procedures and counting voter certificates. It discusses paper ballot accounting, which is no longer our primary system.

Also remarkable is the absence of any provision for ballot accounting on early voting forms. Early Voting Site Security Forms (Security Forms) are filled out by poll workers each day. They record machine serial numbers, seal numbers, and daily electronic ballot counts. There is no place to record the number of voter certificates counted and no worksheet layout for ballot accounting. When certificate counts were recorded it was without consistency and varied from day to day, person to person, and site to site.

A second set of Security Forms is filled out at Elections Central, where election workers take down called-in information from poll workers at the end of each day. The Coalition requested copies of both sets of Security Forms. We labeled the first one, filled out by poll workers at the sites, Set A, and the second, filled out at Election Central, from phone calls, Set B. The information on the two sets sometimes varied. We worked from Set A because it was first-hand information and Set B was second-hand.

In the five sites that we studied, there were no certificate counts recorded on 40 of 71 days, or 56% of the time. What is most revealing in Table 2 is how many times there was no signature count recorded on the Security forms. At two sites, Lemon City Library and North Miami Library, there are no certificate counts recorded for the duration of early voting. An auditable record doesn't exist for these sites except to retrieve all the voter certificates and recount them by hand.

We also found that Security Forms use the term “voter count” when they mean “ballot count”. They lacked a proper multi–page ledger protocol, such as a line to enter “total from page one” or “daily grand total.” As a result, page totals and daily totals, like certificate counts, are entered in a variety of places on the forms. The oath signed by the Clerk and the Election Specialist states only that they have examined the seals, the seal numbers, and the iVotronics and “found that the vote count matched.” With no mention of counting certificates the oath makes it unclear what counts are supposed to have matched what. And with no record of certificate counting, the oath is meaningless with regard to ballot accounting.

This lack of appropriate standards and safeguards in early voting rules, training, and procedures, by the both the State and the County, demonstrates an alarming lack of care for ballot accounting and its fundamental role in producing a valid canvass.

At 5 sites (9% of EV sample) observers could see that ballot counts and signature counts were not reconciled. At another 11 sites (19% of EV sample) observers could not determine whether the two counts were reconciled, usually because of restricted access. At 15 sites (26% of EV sample) closing procedures commenced before the last voter had voted, usually before the public was allowed in. And at one EV site, observers noted that the certificate count was adjusted to match the ballot count.

2. Election–day Observations – See Tables 1 and 3

The Coalition observed thirty–one precincts on Election–day.¹⁴ At five precincts, the process of comparing signatures to ballots cast was not visible enough for observers to be certain that it had occurred. ¹⁵ At seven precincts, the signatures in precinct registers were not counted or were counted before the polls closed.

In ten precincts, there was no effort to compare or reconcile the number of ballots cast with the number of voters who had signed the registers. Two kinds of justifications were offered—that someone else would do it, or that it need not be done.

¹⁴ Two tables in this report summarize the observations and data reported by our volunteers. Table 1, Summary of Poll Observations, categorizes our volunteers’ observations into five broad topic areas, transparency, ballot accounting, people, paper and machines. Table 3, Election–Day Ballot Accounting & Observations, compares the official canvass and certificate no. 2 signature counts to the data that our observers recorded.

¹⁵ This lack of transparency did hide poll workers’ failure to do reconciliation in combined precinct 923 & 951. The signature count was left blank on the Certificate No. 2 for this precinct.

At St. Francis de Sales Church on Alton Road in Miami Beach, (Precincts 39 & 46), our observer quotes a worker as saying that the “count is checked at the Election Office.” At Precinct 576 in the Coral Gate Park Community Center, the observer reported that the clerk “told me that he wasn’t supposed to count the signatures in the registershe stated ‘That ain’t gonna happen here.’” This failure to engage in ballot accounting procedures occurred in 32 % of the precincts that the Coalition observed on Election-day.

When discrepancies were deemed to be minor, efforts to reconcile the ballot count and signature count were abandoned at five precincts. Our observer at Precinct 606 quotes the clerk as saying: “It’s close, that’s good enough.”

Machines were sometimes shut down prematurely, before the process of counting signatures, taking the public counts, and ballot accounting was complete. At Precinct 305 & 373 in the Miami Lakes Branch Library, the volunteer noted that the election specialist “shut down 5 or 6 machines before the last voter had voted and the observers had been let in.”

Finally, our observer at precinct 816 reported that a voting machine broke down while the other machines were being closed. Poll workers counted signatures incorrectly and made no attempt to compare that count to the public count from the machines or to reconcile the totals. Our investigation of precinct 816 found many, many problems, including incorrect totals that counted results from the broken machine several times, as we discuss in detail below.

After Election-day the Coalition again found evidence that poll workers had adjusted the two counts to match rather than account for discrepancies. At Precinct 535, the Dunbar Elementary School, an observer saw no signatures being counted and reported a poll worker stating “they didn’t count them [signatures] and never had.” However, when completing Certificate No. 2, the clerk entered the same number as the public count on the line for the signature count.

A parallel event happened at precinct 162. Two coalition observers noted that the signature count was 533, whereas the public count was 535. One volunteer quotes the Election Specialist as saying that “being off by two didn’t matter.” However, the Certificate No. 2 shows that the poll workers filled in 535 for the signature count to produce a perfect match. Similarly, at precinct 215 our volunteers noted that the public count was 712 and the signature count was 710. But, again the entry on Certificate No. 2 shows that the signature count matched the public count.

3. Analysis of Reported Discrepancies from Certificate No. 2 Forms – See Table 4

The number of voter signatures must be the benchmark by which the number of ballots is measured. MDERC compared two sets of data received from the county: the number of signatures recorded on Certificate No. 2 from each polling place, and the number of ballots counted in the precincts in the certified canvass.¹⁶ We subtracted the number of ballots cast from the number of signatures to find the difference between these numbers. Table 4 compares these two data sets. All discrepancies should, at a minimum, have triggered a review of the number of signatures and ballots from the precincts in question, and any discrepancies not resolved should have been reported to the canvassing board.¹⁷

The comparison reported in Table 4 depended on the data reported on the Certificate No. 2 forms. Later events called into question some of the signature counts reported on Certificate No. 2.¹⁸ Even for some precincts in which Certificate No. 2 and the canvass matched, observations by MDERC observers threw the accuracy of some of the reported signature counts into question. The following comparison, therefore, is limited to an analysis of the *reported* data from the precincts. If the data reported on Certificate No. 2 is not accurate, neither elections officials nor members of the public will be able to identify vote-counting problems.

When there are more voters at the precinct than ballots, the missing ballots are called “lost” votes. If poll workers reported that 100 voters signed in, but only 90 ballots were counted, we would subtract 90 from 100 and find 10 presumed lost votes. If a machine failed to record votes, the only way to detect the problem would be by investigating lost votes. When there are more ballots counted in the canvass than voters who cast ballots, these are called “ghost” votes. If 100 voters were

¹⁶ See Appendix E for an example of Certificate No. 2 (from Precinct 816). Some polling places house more than one precinct. When the Certificate No. 2 forms reported the total number of signatures from more than one precinct, we combined the number of ballots in both precincts in the canvass to make the comparison.

¹⁷ Florida Statutes § 101.5614 requires that the election board report to the county canvassing board any differences between the total number of voted ballots and the number of ballots issued. See Appendix F, Letter to Secretary of State Glenda Hood.

¹⁸ When the Daily Business Review learned from MDERC about the discrepancies, reporter Jessica Walker counted voter signatures in several precincts and found that “in some instances the differences were due to sloppy counting of signatures by poll workers.” Jessica M. Walker, *Number Please*, Daily Business Review, May 6, 2004.

reported to have signed in, but 110 ballots were counted in the canvass, we would subtract 110 from 100 and report -10 because there were fewer signatures than ballots.

For some polling places, we received no data. In 75 polling places, the line for the signature count on Certificate No. 2 was left blank.¹⁹ For five polling places, we noted apparent clerical errors, because the number entered on the signature count line on Certificate No. 2 bore no relation to the number of voters. (These five polling places had discrepancies of more than 500 ballots.)

In the 436 polling places for which we had data, MDERC compared the number of reported voter signatures with the number of ballots shown in the canvass. Excluding the five apparent clerical errors, there were 2,208 presumed “lost votes” with more signatures than ballots, and 1,564 presumed “ghost votes” with fewer signatures than ballots, for a total of 3,772 ballot discrepancies.²⁰ The following list summarizes our findings, which appear in detail in Table 4.

REPORTED SIGNATURES EQUAL TO BALLOTS IN CANVASS

In 176 polling places, these numbers matched perfectly – there were 0 discrepancies between the number of voters and the canvass report of ballots cast. (However, observers at the closings of three of these precincts found discrepancies in the counts or were told that signatures had not been counted.²¹)

MORE VOTER SIGNATURES THAN BALLOTS / PRESUMED “LOST” VOTES

28 polling places had one more voter than there were ballots.
40 polling places had between 2 and 5 more voters than ballots.
19 polling places had between 6 and 10 more voters than ballots.
19 polling places had between 11 and 39 more voters than ballots.
7 polling places had between 50 and 99 more voters than ballots.
4 polling places had over 100 more voters than ballots (156, 232, 281, 296).

FEWER VOTER SIGNATURES THAN BALLOTS / PRESUMED “GHOST” VOTES

¹⁹ These numbers are consistent with the findings of the poll closing observers, who noted that at four of 31 precincts, poll workers did not count the signatures in the precinct registers. See Table 1, Summary of Observations.

²⁰ If the five precincts with apparent clerical errors were included in the total, the total number of discrepancies would increase greatly: 2,208 “lost votes” with more signatures reported than ballots; 5,917 “ghost votes” with fewer signatures than ballots recorded; for a total of 8,125 ballot discrepancies.

²¹ See discussion of precincts 162, 215, and 535 in preceding section.

- 26 polling places had one more ballot than voters.
- 60 polling places had between 2 and 5 more ballots than voters.
- 26 polling places had between 6 and 10 more ballots than voters.
- 19 polling places had between 11 and 37 more ballots than voters.
- 6 polling places had between 52 and 100 more ballots than voters.
- 1 polling place (Precinct 816) had 282 more ballots than voters.

“Ghost” votes do not cancel out “lost” votes. If one precinct has 100 more signatures than ballots and another precinct has 100 more ballots than signatures, the total number of ballot discrepancies is 200, not zero. Otherwise, someone could lose 100 votes at a precinct and claim to have made up for the loss by stuffing a ballot box with 100 votes at a different precinct!

This point is important because a 2004 report by the Miami-Dade County Department of Audit and Management Services (AMS) used an “aggregate” method that used ghost votes in some precincts to offset lost votes in others. AMS produced an “Analysis of Voter Signature Counts to Ballots Cast” for 31 precincts. (See Appendix C.) The table on the September 2002 election included 21 precincts that had more voter signatures than ballots counted (lost votes); taken together, those 21 precincts had 315 lost votes. The table also included 10 precincts that had more ballots than voters (ghost votes); taken together, those 10 precincts had a total of 94 ghost votes. Since both lost votes and ghost votes are discrepancies between the number of voters in a precinct and the number of ballots counted, these numbers should be added together to find the total number of ballot discrepancies. That would yield a total of 409 discrepancies (315 + 94) in 31 precincts. But AMS did not add these errors together. Instead, the AMS report subtracted ghost votes from lost votes across precincts and computed a “total” number of 221 “variances,” stating that “aggregate voter signatures for these precincts exceeded ballots cast by 221.”

The AMS analysis makes the mistake of combining apples with oranges, effectively hiding ballot discrepancies. AMS focused on the number of signatures exceeding ballots to rebut lost vote numbers reported in a 2002 study by the Florida ACLU. But AMS understated the number of lost votes by 30 percent (221 instead of 315) by subtracting the 94 ghost votes. AMS failed to recognize that ghost votes are also problems rather than corrections to lost votes. The AMS report understated the ghost vote discrepancies by 100 percent. Finally, by subtracting those 94 ghost votes instead of adding them, AMS understated the total number of ballot discrepancies by 46 percent (finding a “total” of 221 instead of 409).

Ballot accounting has some similarity to accounting for dollars. We cannot take 100 dollars wrongly from one person's account and fix the problem by giving 100 dollars to someone else. The different precinct discrepancies found in our study of the Certificate No. 2 forms cannot be used to offset each other. Every voter has the right to have his or her vote counted accurately. It is important to the integrity of the canvass that *all* discrepancies be investigated and resolved, whether those discrepancies come from finding too few ballots or too many.

B. VOTE COUNTING PROBLEMS IN PRECINCT 816

Everything went wrong in Precinct 816. There were far more ballots counted than voters. A voting machine broke down, its memory corrupted. The votes from that machine were added to the canvass multiple times. Voter signatures were counted incorrectly. The "total public count" on the machines was added incorrectly by the computer. When it added votes repeatedly or added numbers incorrectly, the voting system did not disclose to poll workers what it was doing with the count. Two different sets of results tapes showed different sets of mistakes that went unaddressed. Elections personnel did not catch the counting errors. Neither poll workers nor department personnel compared voter signatures with ballots cast. The vendor's report on the broken machine was not delivered in a timely manner. State rules and procedures were completely inadequate: the state polling place procedure manual did not direct the poll workers to report electronic ballot accounting problems, and state recount rules would not have discovered the vote-counting problems. All these problems except the broken machine could have been avoided or corrected if the Coalition's recommendations to the Secretary of State and the County had been followed.

1. Counting Problems

Error in signature counting

The number of voters is crucial to finding vote counting problems and understanding the scope of errors. Poll workers in Precinct 816 miscounted the signatures and wrote a total of 834 on Certificate No. 2.²² A later report by the county and a report in the Daily Business Review found that 945 voters had signed in to vote. The error in failing to count 111 signatures was serious, and it made the discrepancy look larger than it was. With correct signature counting, the discrepancy would have

²² A copy of the Certificate No. 2 from Precinct 816 appears in Appendix E.

been 171 ballots. In the study of the Certificate No. 2 forms, Precinct 816 showed 282 ghost votes, one of the largest discrepancies found. The fact that nobody investigated such a large gap between voters and ballots is obviously a problem with the system.

If poll workers make errors counting signatures in some precincts, that does not mean those precincts have no vote counting problems. It means that it is harder to find any problems with vote counting. One error can hide another. In some other precincts, poll workers reported too many signatures rather than too few. If poll workers in Precinct 816 had made a similar mistake and reported too many signatures, the discrepancy would have been reduced and the vote counting problem might never have been found. Accurate signature counts are building blocks for the integrity of the canvass.

Machine breaks down

A Coalition observer witnessed the Election-day problems in Precinct 816. After the poll closed to voters, machine #5116121 abruptly shut down, producing a message that stated: "Internal Malfunction / Unit Closed to Save Data/ Vote Data Corrupted." A poll worker interrupted the closing process in a nearby machine and put the master PEB into #5116121. At first, neither machine could be closed. After consulting with technical specialists, poll workers ran a results tape at 8:23 which had multiple errors. (See Appendix D, Results Tapes from Precinct 816.)

The electronic audit records from this machine, examined later, showed that a discrepancy had developed in its electronic records. The event log, which should show every event that happened to the machine, recorded 84 events in which ballots were cast. The vote image report showed 85 ballots with votes for candidates. These records should be identical—obviously, one of the numbers is wrong.

Votes added multiple times to the canvass

Most importantly, the votes on machine #5116121 were added to the canvass three times instead of once. The report from ES&S recognized that votes were added repeatedly to the PEB.²³ The results tape run at 8:23 on election night showed 1031 ballots cast for candidates and questions.²⁴ Two tapes run at the Elections

²³ In its report, ES&S admits that the votes from the machine were added to the PEB repeatedly. See Appendix H.

²⁴ Two results tapes for precinct 816 appear in Appendix D: the tape run in the precinct at 8:23 p.m. on November 2, and the tape run at the Elections Department on November 5. This precinct included two

Department, on November 3 and again on November 5, both showed the tally rising even further, to a total of 1116 ballots.²⁵ This last incorrect number, 1116 ballots, was the official total certified in the canvass.²⁶

While the votes were being uploaded into the canvass, no error messages warned poll workers about the multiple-counting problems. The results tapes continued to show that the machine had not closed when its votes had been added three times. This is the wrong message for the problem—it raises concerns about whether votes were counted even once rather than whether they are being counted again and again. Poll workers should have checked the signature count and found out how many ballots should be there. They should have found the problem. But the machine should also have told them what it was doing. Repeated vote counting is a critical failure, and so is the failure of the system to catch the repetition.

Errors in addition--public counts on results tapes don't add up

The machine also had trouble with simple addition. There were 861 ballots recorded on the other machines in this precinct. Depending on which computer file was used, either 84 or 85 ballots should have been added from machine #5116121. Therefore, the “total public count” should have been 945 (if 84 ballots were added) or 946 (if 85 ballots were added). But the “total public count” on the tape run at the precinct was 947, and the “total public count” on the tape run at the elections department was 1032. These numbers simply do not add up. Neither the County report nor the ES&S report discuss the failures in adding the public counts.

Election workers and the public assume that machines designed to add numbers will do their jobs correctly. There are no instructions anywhere telling poll workers to check the addition done by the machines—only accurate signature counts provide a check on the number of ballots. In this case, there was a discrepancy of 2 ballots between the 945 signatures on precinct registers and the “total public count” on the

different parts, with different ballot styles. The two parts of the precinct are added together to reach a precinct total in the canvass, but they are shown separately on the results tape. On the tape run on November 2 at 8:23, there were 1019 ballots on this tape in one part of the precinct, and 12 in the other.
²⁵ See the tape from November 5 in Appendix D. Both of the later tapes showed 1102 ballots in one part of the precinct, and 14 in the other.

²⁶ The votes for each candidate and question can be seen on the results tapes in Appendix D. In the presidential election, the final tally in the canvass for precinct 816 showed 270 votes for Bush, 834 votes for Kerry, 1 vote each for Peroutka, Badnarik, and Brown, 4 votes for Nader, and 5 “undervote” ballots that showed no choice for President. (Although the results tapes do not show the votes according to the machine on which they were cast, none of the undervotes for president appeared on machine #5116121.)

results tape run at the precinct. *If a discrepancy of 2 was ignored as unimportant, the faulty addition done by the machine would never be discovered.* This proves the importance of investigating even small discrepancies in the counts.

Voting machines should be able to add correctly. We cannot determine what caused this error in addition, but investigation of the error is vitally important. If numbers were changed somehow when the machine broke down, if the machine added them wrong, if the machine added some numbers and subtracted others, or if some entirely different problem occurred—the nature of this mistake in addition must be investigated and documented.

The investigation cannot be left to the vendor. ES&S studied this machine in December 2004, but the county apparently received the results in May 2005. (See Appendix H, Report from ES&S.) The ES&S report does not adequately address all the problems revealed on the results tape. An independent expert should evaluate the machine problems, the system failures, and the vote counting problems from Precinct 816.

Results tapes riddled with conflicting numbers

When a machine adds the same numbers three different ways, it ought to figure out that it has a problem. It should call for help, and it should tell the human beings who are working with it what is going wrong. This machine allowed different errors to be produced on the same tapes without warning anyone about the conflict.

The results tapes in precinct 816 ultimately showed three different ballot counts. These include a “total public count” from all machines, the separate public counts from each individual machine, and the total count of the number of ballots counted for candidates and questions on each ballot style within the precinct. Different errors appeared on the tapes run at the precinct and at the elections department.

The tape run at the precinct on November 2 showed individual machines that should have added up to 945, a “total public count” of 947, and a total of 1031 ballots cast with the vote totals for candidates and questions. The tapes run at the elections department showed individual machines that should have added up to 945, a “total public count” of 1032, and a total of 1116 ballots with vote totals for the candidates

and questions.²⁷ Even though there were really three different counts on each results tape, the tapes did not include an error message about the conflicting numbers.

2. Inadequacy of state rules and procedures

The ballot-counting problems in precinct 816 also reveal gaps and problems in Florida election rules and procedures. The procedures in the Florida Polling Place Procedures Manual would not have identified or corrected the problem. If the presidential election had been close enough for a recount, neither the “machine recount” rule nor the “manual recount” rule would have found the vote-counting problem. Finally, even though an important security report identified a high-risk danger that votes could be uploaded to the tally multiple times, the State of Florida had not created special instructions to poll workers to guard against multiple uploading of votes.

State law requires that poll workers verify the number of voted ballots to determine whether that number correspond with the number of ballots issued, and that they report discrepancies to the canvassing board. Before the election, MDERC wrote to Secretary of State Glenda Hood, explaining that the only way to verify the number of electronic ballots was to count the number of voter signatures. We pointed out that the Florida Polling Place Procedures Manual did not include a procedure for accounting for voted electronic ballots in DRE counties. We urged Secretary Hood to take action so that all counties would count signatures and verify the number of voted ballots, but she did not. (See Appendix F, Letter to Secretary of State Glenda Hood.) The procedures specified in the state Manual would not have detected this vote-counting error or required it to be corrected.

State recount rules would have failed to detect and correct the vote-counting error. The rules do not check on whether the machine correctly added the votes. The “machine recount” rule in DRE counties compares the printed result from the precinct to the total reported for that precinct in the canvass.²⁸ This is not really a recount—it

²⁷ The different ballot styles in the precinct were reported separately on the tape. See Note 24. The total number of votes on both ballot styles is 1116.

²⁸ The Florida administrative rule, 1S-2.031(5)(c), Touchscreen Ballot Machine Recounts, states:

“1. The county canvassing board shall be required to produce printed vote totals for the affected race or races for each precinct.

2. The county canvassing board shall verify that the total votes for the recounted race or races taken from the printed vote totals for each precinct are the same as the total votes shown on the county totals from election night. If there is a discrepancy, the county canvassing board shall investigate and resolve the discrepancy.”

is basically a revisit of the printed results. In Precinct 816, the final results tapes run on November 3 and November 5 showed 1116 ballots. The canvass matched the votes on the final tapes. Because the two final tapes matched each other and matched the canvass, the “machine recount” would not have found the vote-counting problem.

In contrast, the manual recount statute looks only for ballots that were not already counted by the computer; it calls for counting overvotes and undervotes. Florida Statutes § 102.166. In October 2004, the state Division of Elections published an emergency manual recount rule that was in effect during the November election.²⁹ The emergency rule required that a ballot image report be produced for every machine on which an undervote for president had been recorded.³⁰ The undervotes in the ballot image report were to be counted manually and compared with the total number of undervotes in the precinct.

The procedure in the Emergency Recount Rule would not have identified the vote-counting problem in Precinct 816 if there had been a recount in the Presidential election. There were no undervotes for president recorded on machine #5116121. Therefore, the votes from that machine could be added to the tally several times without triggering review in a manual recount or changing the number of undervotes in the precinct.

Counting only undervotes ignores problems in machines that have no undervotes. This creates a random effect in recounts. Multiple-counting will be detected for machines that have at least one undervote in the contest, but multiple-counted votes on other machines will not be found. To verify that all votes cast by

²⁹ The emergency recount rule, 1SER04-1, Manual Recount Procedures for Touchscreen Voting Systems, has since expired. The emergency rule was written after a rule barring all manual recounts on touchscreen voting systems was struck down in a lawsuit brought by the Florida American Civil Liberties Union, Southwest Voter Registration Project, Common Cause Florida, Florida Southern Christian Leadership Conference Chapter, and the Florida Voters League.

³⁰ The emergency recount rule, 1SER04-1(7)(a), states: “The canvassing board shall order the printing of one (1) official copy of the ballot image report from each touchscreen voting machine that has recorded undervotes for the affected race or issue.” The manual rule defined an “undervote” to mean “that the tabulator recorded no vote for the office or issue or that the elector did not designate the number of choices allowed for the office or issue.” 1SER04-1(4)(e).

Counting votes multiple times does not turn them into “overvotes” under the manual recount rule, because an “overvote” means the voter made too many choices, not that the votes were counted too many times: “‘overvote’ means that the elector designated more names than there are persons to be elected to an office or designated more than one answer to a ballot issue.” 1SER04-1(4)(d). The rule did not try to count overvotes because touchscreen voting machines cannot record overvotes. Both the statute and the rule are structured so that a manual recount does not look for votes that were counted more than once.

voters were counted once and only once, a recount rule must verify how many ballots *should have been found* at the precinct.

Finally, the state failed to respond effectively after a security flaw was found in the ES&S iVotronic. In 2003, a security study of several voting systems was conducted by the Compuware Corporation for the Secretary of State of Ohio.³¹ The study warned that the iVotronic system permitted votes to be added to the tally multiple times when a machine broke down. The system offered election workers the choice to “add to” or “replace” vote totals, but the system did not warn that it was adding a machine repeatedly.

When inadvertent ballot stuffing was identified as a security risk, the state should have created procedures to avoid it. The Compuware report recommended that the Ohio Secretary of State “require that administrative policies and procedures be put into place regarding use of the ‘Add To’ feature.”³² Florida should have done the same. It is not yet clear whether the “add to” feature caused the vote counting problems in precinct 816. Perhaps study of the problems in this precinct will ultimately reveal an additional way to add votes repeatedly to the tally. However, if poll workers and election personnel had been warned about double-counting votes and trained in special procedures for adding totals from broken machines, the problem might have been avoided entirely

It is more important to get the count right the first time, *every time*, than to seek corrections through a recount. The measures recommended by MDERC would have detected the vote-counting problem and helped to correct it, whether it was caused by known flaws or new ones. *If election workers had checked signatures against ballots, they would have found and corrected the problems with counting votes and counting signatures in Precinct 816.*

C. ACCESS AND TRANSPARENCY

Effective access for the public was a problem at many locations during the entire election.³³ From the beginning of early voting, MDERC found that poll workers at many

³¹ Compuware Corporation, Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Technical Security Report (November 21, 2003), available online at <http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/files/compuware.pdf> , at pages 105, 109, 125, 129, 132, 135.

³² Compuware study, page 132.

³³ Florida law clearly provides for public access on Election-day. Fla Stat. 101.5614 provides in relevant part:

of the 20 early voting sites deliberately blocked the public's ability to observe poll closings. On October 22, 2004, the Coalition wrote to the Miami-Dade County Supervisor of Elections detailing difficulties that observers had encountered and asking the County to allow greater public access during early voting. Our letter was ignored, but several high-ranking Elections Department officials stated orally that County policy was to allow the public limited access and not to share the counts of voter certificates or the public counts on the machines.³⁴

Early voting is a new process under Florida law and written County procedures do not directly address what type of public access should be provided during closing. Both the County and the Secretary of State should interpret Florida law broadly to ensure public access and to provide greater transparency in ballot accounting. In the November election, approximately thirty-one percent of voters cast their ballots during early voting. For all these voters and for the public, transparency is a vital procedural safeguard. If existing laws and procedures are not adequate to ensure public scrutiny, the Miami-Dade delegation should press for changes in Florida law. Access and transparency are central values in improving voter confidence in the integrity of the canvass and as a consequence public witnessing of closings and ballot accounting is essential.

Election workers displayed confusion about the County's access policy, and implementation varied from site to site. As a consequence, we could not collect accurate, uniform data. However, this spurred the Coalition to document the extent of the access limitations imposed by the County and how this made early voting a less transparent process..

(1) As soon as the polls are closed, the election board shall secure the voting devices against further voting. The election board shall thereafter, in the presence of members of the public desiring to witness the proceedings, verify the number of voted ballots, unused ballots, provisional ballots, and spoiled ballots to ascertain whether such number corresponds with the number of ballots issued by the supervisor.....

The Coalition's position on public access during early voting is stated in an October 22, 2004 letter to Constance Kaplan that is attached as Appendix B to this report. The Secretary of State's opinion on access during early voting for both partisan observers and the public can be found in an August 11, 2004 letter to the Elections Supervisor of Osceola County, available online at the Division of Elections Web site. <http://election.dos.state.fl.us/opinions/new/2004/de0407.pdf>.

³⁴ Observers sought to find out the daily total of voters signing in to vote and of ballots recorded on voting machines. They did not seek to discover the number of votes for candidates or questions during early voting. Election results, by law, cannot be disclosed until the polls have closed on Election-day.

Three kinds of transparency problems arose during early voting. The most common was restricted physical access; our volunteers reported this twenty-nine times, which was 33% of the sample. Observers were often sequestered so that they could not see the number of machines at the site, as happened at North Shore and Kendall Libraries. These restrictions were so limiting that on eleven occasions the observer could not determine whether any effort was made to count voter certificates and compare them to the public counts on the machines. At the Election Department site, an observer was denied access to the polling area where the machines were, although she was allowed into an outer area.

At many of the sites no count was made of voter certificates during the time the public could observe the proceedings. Poll workers regularly stated that the certificates had been counted during the day and that this process was finished by the time observers were allowed to enter.

Finally, poll workers often refused to reveal either the certificate tally and/or the public counts on the machines. After workers had extracted the votes at some sites they made every effort not to communicate the totals publicly. One observer at the Lemon City Library site described the situation as follows:

E.S. [Election Specialist] blocked the screens with his body in an exaggerated manner and read the count to the Clerk in Spanish and in a very low voice. I asked him to please read the numbers in English. He became visibly annoyed... I was told that the tallies were public only later in the evening or the next day.

Another volunteer was prematurely escorted from the North Shore Library site before the count was called in. These were not isolated occurrences. Early voting was observed over six days at the Coral Gables Library and the results were never communicated publicly.

In many cases, these access restrictions precluded observers from determining whether certificates had been counted and compared to the public counts on the machines. Therefore our finding that reconciliation did not occur six percent of the time is most likely an underestimate of the problem.

Transparency and access problems continued on Election-day. In Precinct 24 at the Nautilus Middle School poll workers barred access to the stage of a school auditorium where they counted signatures and reconciled the count. As the observer noted, this was “[n]ot very transparent. No way to check the signatures or the total.” Similar verifiability problems occurred at precincts 111, 162, and 548 where all the registers were put away by the time the observers were allowed into the polling place.

Complete denial of physical access was also a problem. On Election-day poll workers at Precinct 37 in Miami Beach City Hall denied access to a civic-minded teenager, who properly identified herself to the staff. She was told to wait outside after the last voter entered and only after the closing was completed did a poll worker tell her that it was “illegal” for her to watch any of the proceedings.

Finally, even straightforward statutory transparency requirements were not satisfied. Florida St. 102.071³⁵ and county procedures require poll workers to post a copy of the results tape on the entrance to the polling place. Workers at 10% of the observed precincts failed to do so.

D. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS

1. Security

The Coalition remains concerned about the county’s practice of turning on machines the night before the election, or in the case of early voting in this election, up to three days before voting began, rather than the morning of the election. Leaving the machines on for these additional hours, with varying degrees of site security, exposes elections to additional threats of mishap and mischief. While the County has recognized these dangers, it continues the practice to avoid delays in poll openings in case the machines do not boot up promptly in the morning. This is a security issue that *should* be resolved.

The Coalition documented other chain of custody problems at several polling places. On five occasions during early voting observers noted that machines were closed or shipped without seals. On the last day of early voting at Coral Reef Library, our observer watched the Election Specialist download unsealed machines that had been taken out of service at some point. The specialist stated that these machines had never been sealed and had been left in the polling room unsealed.³⁶

³⁵ This section provides in part: “The election board shall post at the polls, for the benefit of the public, the results of the voting for each office or other item on the ballot as the count is completed.”

³⁶ Twice during early voting poll workers did not fill in security forms at Miami Beach City Hall. This also occurred at Precinct 576. In addition, poll workers at Precinct 548 did not properly store and/or transport paper ballots. Seals, chain of custody and proper record-keeping are vital steps in assuring the integrity of the canvass.

2. West Dade Regional Library

Observers filed multiple reports of conditions at early voting site #10, West Dade Regional Library, which raised a number of concerns that the Coalition believes warrant further investigation by the County. Two of the reports are summarized here.

- Report 1. On Thursday, October 28, 2004, two members of the Coalition arrived at the site at approximately 7:40 PM to observe closing procedures. They were directed to a man from Team Metro who described himself as the “site supervisor” and who said he was “in charge” of the site.
 - The man was courteous, professional, and forthcoming with information.
 - The man said that he and “his team” had relieved poll workers to take lunch breaks

- Report 2. On Saturday, October 30, 2004, a different pair of Coalition members arrived at the site at approximately 7:00 PM to observe closing procedures. The inquired about Team Metro’s presence at the polling place and were told that several of the poll workers and goodwill ambassadors were Team Metro employees in their regular jobs. They were directed to the man “who was in charge of Team Metro” at the site.
 - The man told them he was the “supervisor” of the West Dade polling place and only the West Dade polling place.
 - The man told them he had three other Miami–Dade employees under his supervision who were not at the polling place in any other capacity (e.g. poll workers, goodwill ambassadors)
 - The man told them that he and his employees had substituted for the poll workers during the day so they could get lunch and have breaks without slowing down the traffic through the polling place.
 - The man was quite open about who he was and what he was doing.

Report 1 noted the man’s name, and a subsequent review of county records by the Coalition finds no one by that name on records of “County Employees”, “Non–County Employees”, or “Temps” lists. Several signatures on the Election Board’s oath are indecipherable, so we cannot tell from looking at them who was a member of the board.³⁷

³⁷ Copies of oath and payroll records were provided by the Elections Department, a spokesman for which said it was a complete record of personnel in that site so far as they could determine.

The Coalition has the following concerns:

1. Who were the members of the man's "team"? Were the persons who were alleged by the man to have relieved poll workers themselves sworn members of the election board?
2. Have all resources devoted to this election been fully accounted for in the county's reports of the cost of the election? Knowing the true cost of an election, including comp time and other "soft costs," is vital to assessing the value and efficiency of a given voting system.

3. Resource Allocation

On the opening morning of early voting, October 18, 2004, the Coalition received multiple accounts from its own members and others of inadequate resources at the Government Center early voting site. The AFL-CIO and other groups had organized a march and rally from the Lyric Theater in Overtown to Government Center, to bring voters to the polls. National figures such as Rev. Al Sharpton attended.

Rally organizers and participants told MDERC observers that senior Elections officials had promised additional resources, especially laptop computers for checking in voters, would be put in place in anticipation of heavy demand from the march and rally. However, only four laptops were on hand, resulting in a significant back-up of voters wishing to vote. Many voters had to leave. The AFL-CIO provided busses to take voters to alternate polling places, which provided some relief. A large contingent of the public was left frustrated. At the same event, a Coalition member found that there were no provisional ballots on hand at the site; one voter who required a provisional ballot waited 30 minutes or more and ultimately returned the next day.

Resource and training problems occurred at the Lemon City Library, located in a predominately Haitian-American community. Election workers were poorly trained and confused by the pressure placed on them by partisan poll-watchers who raised objections to translators attempting to give assistance to Creole-speaking voters who had requested assistance. Both poll workers and voters were intimidated by the conditions at the site. Translators were told they had to hold their hands behind their backs, change out of union shirts, and assist only one voter at a time, including waiting with a single voter in long lines, according to reports. Haitian-American community

leaders took their concerns to County officials and to the US Justice Department. This was also reported in the press.³⁸

The events at Lemon City are of particular concern because of historic problems with assistance for Haitian voters. After the 2000 election, the United States Department of Justice and Miami-Dade County negotiated a consent decree regarding the rights of Haitian voters. The decree requires the county to provide language assistance and allow Haitian voters to bring assistants into the voting booth. The county should have trained its poll workers sufficiently to protect assistance for Haitian voters.

The Coalition is concerned that the differences in number of votes cast at early voting sites may be a question not only of voter turnout but also of resource allocation. For example, the West Dade site produced the greatest number of votes cast of any early voting site – more than Government Center, which had twice as many machines, and three times more than Lemon City which was open for the same number of hours but is a smaller site. In order to determine the effects of allocation of resources on voting, the County should make public cost and personnel breakdowns for the various sites.

Cost

This report did not concentrate on cost, but cost is obviously a factor in resource allocation. Costs have risen sharply since the County adopted the iVotronic system. The Elections Department and the County Manager are currently reviewing this voting system.

The initial investment in the system cost the County \$24.5 million dollars. The ongoing operating costs have been greater than anticipated. County records put the cost of the November 2004 general election at \$6.643 million and this may understate the true cost once comp time and impacts on other county departments are fully factored. The Elections Department drew staff from many other County Departments in order to run this election. A partial review of early voting payroll records show

³⁸ November 2, 2004, Sun Sentinel, HUNDREDS TO MONITOR S. FLORIDA POLL SITES, states: "A group of Haitian-American leaders also met with a representative from the U.S. Justice Department on Monday to complain about difficulties faced by Haitian-Americans voting early in Little Haiti.

Jean-Robert LaFortune, of the Haitian American Grassroots Coalition, said Republican poll workers were challenging the use of translators at the Lemon City and North Miami public libraries."

extraordinarily long days that the staff had to work, fifteen and sixteen hour days in some cases.

4. Long Delays & System Stress

Two other problems are noteworthy. During early voting, long delays were not uncommon. This was partially due to heavy turnout, but staffing and equipment shortages also contributed. On the last day of early voting our volunteers noted that slow electronic equipment typically contributed to extremely long close-outs times, extending the process late into the night or the next morning.

IV. CONCLUSION

Miami-Dade County has made public its interest in replacing direct recording electronic voting machines with optical scan equipment. The issues raised in this report apply no matter what form of technology is used to record and tally votes. Good procedures and accountability are crucial to every voting system.

Ballot accounting in the precincts is crucial--get it right the first time. Without correct data, no one will know where to look for problems. New legislation now awaiting the governor's signature will require the canvassing board to certify that they have reconciled the number of voters and ballots. But the devil is in the details--if ballot accounting procedures are not carried out correctly or numbers from the precincts are not reported accurately, it will be difficult to know whether the totals really match without counting the signatures again.

Count, compare, investigate and report. The signature count must be correct. The total numbers of ballots and voters signatures must be compared to be sure that no vote is lost or counted repeatedly. Even small discrepancies may reveal big problems. When new developments such as early voting require new methods to keep track of all ballots, good procedures must rise to the challenge.

Make sure the public can see the process and understand it - protect transparency in elections. Public participation is a cornerstone of democracy. Voters should be able to trust that everything done with their ballots happens in the sunshine. To gain that trust, voters must be able to see what happens.

Table 1 – Summary of Poll Observations
Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition
November 2, 2004 General Election – Miami-Dade County, Florida

Category	Issue	Early Voting Occurrences	Election Day Occurrences	Total Occurrences	Percent Of Sample
Transparency	Observers were refused access or not readily granted access	Elections Department, North Shore Regional Library	37 [denied] & 828 [challenged but finally allowed in]	4	5%
	Restricted access left observers unable to witness the proceedings.	North Dade Library, North Miami Library [2], Lemon City Library, Northeast Library, Miami Beach City Hall [2], Coral Gables Library [5], South Dade Library, Kendall Library [3], Model City Library, Miami City Hall [4], JFK Library, Elections Department, North Shore Library = 24	24, 39 & 46, 111, 535, 606 = 5	29	33%
	Closing Procedures Commenced Before Last Voter Left	West Dade Library [2], Elections Department, Model City, JFK Library, North Shore Library, Coral Gables Library [5], Miami Beach City Hall [2], Coral Reef Library [2] =15	24, 111, 162, 305 & 373, 417 & 458, 517, 524 & 568, 535, 548, 576, 606, 717 & 794, 816 = 12	27	31%
	Poor Identification of Poll Workers and their Roles	Typical	Typical	Typ	Typ
	Failure to Post Results Tape on Election Day		24, 535, 576	3	10 (E-Day Only)

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Ballot Accounting	EV Machine counts and certificate counts were not reconciled.	North Miami Library [2], Government Center, West Miami City Hall, West Dade Public Library		5	9% (EV only)
	EV – Certificate count adjusted to match public count	West Dade Library		1	0.2% (EV only)
	Election Day – Signature count adjusted to match public count		162, 215, 535	3	10% (E-Day only)
	Election Day – No effort to reconcile		39 & 46, 162, 215, 517, 524 & 568, 535, 548, 576, 828, 923 & 951 = 10	10	32 % (E-Day only)
	Election Day – Ballot accounting efforts abandoned		261 & 288, 418, 511, 606, 717 & 794	5	16% (E-Day only)
	Election Day – Ballot accounting abandoned. Machine malfunction. Ballots counted into certified canvass multiple times. Remains unresolved to date.		816	1	3% (E-Day only)
	Machines were locked down or sealed prior to reconciliation	North Miami Library, Government Center	305 & 373	3	3%
	Total Observed Occurrences of Counts Not Reconciled – EV and E-Day			26	30%
	EV – Observers uncertain whether machine counts and certificate counts were reconciled.	Kendall Public Library, JFK Library, North Shore Library, Coral Gables Library [5], Miami Beach City Hall [2], Coral Reef Library		11	19% (EV only)

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	Election Day – Observers uncertain whether reconciliation occurred		30, 606, 816, 828, 923 & 951	5	16% (E-Day only)
People	Observers allowed in before last voter finished voting	North Miami Library, Lemon City, Coral Gables Library [4], West Kendall Library, Model City Library, Coral Reef Library, Miami City Hall [2], North Shore Branch Library = 12	417 & 458, 535, 548, 576, 816 = 5	17	19%
	Long Delays due to heavy turnout and difficulties in closing operations	South Dade Library, West Kendall Library, Model City Library, JFK Library, West Miami City Hall		5	9% (EV only)
	Team Metro personnel reported supervising site and relieving election workers for breaks	West Dade Library [2]		2	4% (EV only)
	Compensation complaints & excessive focus on payroll forms	West Miami City Hall, Miami City Hall	111	3	3%
	Poll Workers were confused about procedures	North Miami Library, Lemon City Library, West Dade Library, Coral Reef Library	548	5	6%
Paper	Register Signatures were not counted		535, 548, 576, 923 & 951	4	13% (E-Day only)
	Register Signatures counted before closing		111, 162, 548	3	10% (E-Day only)
	Paper Ballots were not stored and transported according to procedure		548	1	3% (E-Day only)

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Miami–Dade Election Reform Coalition
November 2, 2004 General Election – Miami–Dade County, Florida

Category	Issue	Early Voting Occurrences	Election Day Occurrences	Total Occurrences	Percent Of Sample
	Security Forms were not properly filled out	Miami City Hall [2]	576	3	3%
	Individual machine counts not recorded		548	1	6%
Machines	Ballots from malfunctioning machine uploaded into canvass multiple times. See Section III B.		816	1	3% (E-Day only)
	Machines closed during EV without seals and/or shipped in transit unsealed	Coral Reef Library, Coral Gables Library, West Miami City Hall, Miami City Hall [2]		5	9% (EV only)
	Long delays caused by slow electronic equipment close-out process on final day of EV	North Miami Library, Miami Beach City Hall, Coral Gables Library, Model City Library, JFK Library =5		5	Typical

Table 2
Early Voting Ballot Accounting and Observations

Site # 2: North Miami Library

Miami Dade Election Reform Coalition
 November 2, 2004 General Election - Miami-Dade County, Florida

Date of Polling	Election Records		MDERC Poll-Closing Observations & Analysis							
	Early Voting Site Security Forms		Note (See Key)	Observed Result		Daily Ballots Cast (Derived)	Difference: Daily Sig Count Minus Daily Ballots Cast	Difference: Daily Ballots Cast Minus Observed Daily Ballots Cast	Difference: Daily Sig. Count Minus Observed Daily Sig. Count	
	Cum. Ballots Cast	Reported Daily Cert. Sig. Count		Daily Ballots Cast	Daily Cert. Sig. Count					
18-Oct	663	NDR		663	663	663	CC	0	CC	
19-Oct	1246	NDR		583	583	583	CC	0	CC	
20-Oct	1901	NDR	A	651	646	655	CC	4	CC	
21-Oct	2604	NDR		709	713	703	CC	(6)	CC	
22-Oct	3429	NDR		825	835	825	CC	0	CC	
23-Oct	3883	NDR		445	446	454	CC	9	CC	
24-Oct	4343	NDR		500	499	460	CC	(40)	CC	
25-Oct	5512	NDR				1169	CC	CC	CC	
26-Oct	6928	NDR				1416	CC	CC	CC	
27-Oct	8421	NDR				1493	CC	CC	CC	
28-Oct	9914	NDR				1493	CC	CC	CC	
29-Oct		NDR				CC	CC	CC	CC	
30-Oct		NDR				CC	CC	CC	CC	
31-Oct		NDR		1036	1025	CC	CC	CC	CC	
1-Nov										
Results Tape Total Public Count:		13557					Total Vote Discrepancies			
Total Cert Sig Count:		CC								
Number of days of NDR:		14						CC		
Percent of total days NDR:		100%								
KEY										
NDR : No data recorded										
CC: Cannot calculate values since data is not available.										
A: Ballots cast reported changed from 124 to 24 and from 4 to 8 in two iVotronics m/c overnight.										

Table 2
Early Voting Ballot Accounting and Observations

Site # 3 : Lemon City Library

Miami Dade Election Reform Coalition
 November 2, 2004 General Election - Miami-Dade County, Florida

Date of Polling	Election Records		MDERC Poll-Closing Observations & Analysis						
	Early Voting Site Security Forms		Note (See Key)	Observed Result		Daily Ballots Cast (Derived)	Difference: Daily Sig Count Minus Daily Ballots Cast	Difference: Daily Ballots Cast Minus Observed Daily Ballots Cast	Difference: Daily Sig. Count Minus Observed Daily Sig. Count
	Cum. Ballots Cast	Reported Daily Cert. Sig. Count		Daily Ballots Cast	Daily Cert. Sig. Count				
18-Oct	327	NDR				327	CC	CC	CC
19-Oct	642	NDR	B			315	CC	CC	CC
20-Oct	912	NDR	B			270	CC	CC	CC
21-Oct	1189	NDR	B			277	CC	CC	CC
22-Oct	1468	NDR				279	CC	CC	CC
23-Oct	1714	NDR				246	CC	CC	CC
24-Oct	1933	NDR				219	CC	CC	CC
25-Oct	2467	NDR				534	CC	CC	CC
26-Oct		NDR	C			CC	CC	CC	CC
27-Oct	3740	NDR				CC	CC	CC	CC
28-Oct	4581	NDR				841	CC	CC	CC
29-Oct	5488	NDR				907	CC	CC	CC
30-Oct	5985	NDR				497	CC	CC	CC
31-Oct	6547	NDR				562	CC	CC	CC
1-Nov									
Results Tape Total Public Count:		6547					Total Vote Discrepancies		
Total Cert Sig Count:		CC							
Number of days of NDR:		14					CC		
Percent of total days NDR:		100%							
KEY									
NDR : No data recorded									
CC: Cannot calculate values since data is not available.									
B: Observer was not provided count even after requesting it.									
C: Missing Site Security Form									

Table 2
Early Voting Ballot Accounting and Observations

Site # 8 : South Dade Regional Library

Miami Dade Election Reform Coalition
November 2, 2004 General Election - Miami-Dade County, Florida

Date of Polling	Election Records		MDERC Poll-Closing Observations & Analysis						
	Early Voting Site Security Forms		Note (See Key)	Observed Result		Daily Ballots Cast (Derived)	Difference: Daily Sig Count Minus Daily Ballots Cast	Difference: Daily Ballots Cast Minus Observed Daily Ballots Cast	Difference: Daily Sig. Count Minus Observed Daily Sig. Count
	Cum. Ballots Cast	Reported Daily Cert. Sig. Count		Daily Ballots Cast	Daily Cert. Sig. Count				
18-Oct	572	NDR		572	573	572	CC	0	CC
19-Oct	1255	683				683	0	CC	CC
20-Oct	1932	677				677	0	CC	CC
21-Oct	2637	705				705	0	CC	CC
22-Oct	3332	695				695	0	CC	CC
23-Oct	3820	488				488	0	CC	CC
24-Oct	4330	510		510		510	0	0	CC
25-Oct	5508	1178				1178	0	CC	CC
26-Oct	6897	1389				1389	0	CC	CC
27-Oct	8218	1321				1321	0	CC	CC
28-Oct	9799	1581				1581	0	CC	CC
29-Oct	10343	NDR				544	CC	CC	CC
30-Oct	12247	NDR				1904	CC	CC	CC
31-Oct	NDR	NDR		966		CC	CC	CC	CC
1-Nov									
Results Tape Total Public Count:		13213					Total Vote Discrepancies		
Total Cert Sig Count:		9227							
Number of days of NDR:		4					0		
Percent of total days NDR:		29%							
KEY									
NDR : No data recorded									
CC: Cannot calculate values since data is not available.									

Table 2
Early Voting Ballot Accounting and Observations

Site # 10 : West Dade Regional Library

Miami Dade Election Reform Coalition
 November 2, 2004 General Election - Miami-Dade County, Florida

Date of Polling	Election Records		MDERC Poll-Closing Observations & Analysis						
	Early Voting Site Security Forms		Note (See Key)	Observed Result		Daily Ballots Cast (Derived)	Difference: Daily Sig Count Minus Daily Ballots Cast	Difference: Daily Ballots Cast Minus Observed Daily Ballots Cast	Difference: Daily Sig. Count Minus Observed Daily Sig. Count
	Cum. Ballots Cast	Reported Daily Cert. Sig. Count		Daily Ballots Cast	Daily Cert. Sig. Count				
18-Oct	1052	NDR				1052	CC	CC	CC
19-Oct	2134	NDR				1082	CC	CC	CC
20-Oct	3050	NDR				916	CC	CC	CC
21-Oct	4136	1086				1086	0	CC	CC
22-Oct	5137	1001				1001	0	CC	CC
23-Oct	5838	701				701	0	CC	CC
24-Oct	6648	810				810	0	CC	CC
25-Oct	8504	1856				1856	0	CC	CC
26-Oct	10598	2094	D	2094	2100	2094	0	0	(6)
27-Oct	12684	2086				2086	0	CC	CC
28-Oct	14927	2243		2243	2242	2243	0	0	1
29-Oct	17340	2413				2413	0	CC	CC
30-Oct	18487	1147				1147	0	CC	CC
31-Oct	19740	NDR				1253	CC	CC	CC
1-Nov									
Results Tape Total Public Count:		19740					Total Vote Discrepancies		
Total Cert Sig Count:		15437					0		
Number of days of NDR:		4							
Percent of total days NDR:		29%							
KEY									
NDR : No data recorded									
CC: Cannot calculate values since data is not available.									
D: At first it was announced that certificate count was 2100 and changed to 2094 without any recount.									

Table 2
Early Voting Ballot Accounting and Observations

Site # 14 : SPCC Govt. Center

Miami Dade Election Reform Coalition
November 2, 2004 General Election - Miami-Dade County, Florida

Date of Polling	Election Records		MDERC Poll-Closing Observations & Analysis						
	Early Voting Site Security Forms		Note (See Key)	Observed Result		Daily Ballots Cast (Derived)	Difference: Daily Sig Count Minus Daily Ballots Cast	Difference: Daily Ballots Cast Minus Observed Daily Ballots Cast	Difference: Daily Sig. Count Minus Observed Daily Sig. Count
	Cum. Ballots Cast	Reported Daily Cert. Sig. Count		Daily Ballots Cast	Daily Cert. Sig. Count				
18-Oct	617	NDR		617	617	617	CC	0	CC
19-Oct	1434	NDR			817	817	CC	CC	CC
20-Oct	2189	NDR		755	755	755	CC	0	CC
21-Oct	3013	NDR		824	823	824	CC	0	CC
22-Oct	3878	NDR		865	865	865	CC	0	CC
23-Oct	4226	348		348	348	348	0	0	0
24-Oct	4535	309				309	0	CC	CC
25-Oct	6176	1640				1641	(1)	CC	CC
26-Oct	7882	1704				1706	(2)	CC	CC
27-Oct	9802	1920				1920	0	CC	CC
28-Oct	11946	2142				2144	(2)	CC	CC
29-Oct	14208	2262			2262	2262	0	CC	0
30-Oct	15027	821		819	821	819	2	0	0
31-Oct	15998	970				971	(1)	CC	CC
1-Nov	18231	2229			2229	2233	(4)		
Results Tape Total Public Count:		18231					Total Vote Discrepancies		
Total Cert Sig Count:		14345					12		
Number of days of NDR:		5							
Percent of total days NDR:		33%							
KEY									
NDR : No data recorded									
CC: Cannot calculate values since data is not available.									

Table 3
Election-Day Ballot Accounting and Observations

Miami Dade Election Reform Coalition
November 2, 2004 General Election – Miami-Dade County, Florida

Election Records				MDERC Poll-Closing Observations & Analysis						
Precinct	Ballots Cast	Signature Count (from Certificate No. 2 Forms)	Note (See Key)		Observed Result		Difference: Sig Count Minus Ballots Cast	Dif as %	Difference: Ballots Cast Minus Observed Ballot Count	Difference: Sig Count Minus Observed Sig Count
					Ballots Cast as recorded by poll closing observers	Signature Count as recorded by poll closing observers				
24	550		A	D	550				0	
30	866	866			866	865	0	0.00%	0	1
37	286	286		C			0	0.00%		
39 in w/46 but separate cert #2	623	618			623	618	(5)	-0.80%	0	0
46 in w/39 but separate cert #2	594	582		G			(12)	-2.02%		0
110	232	232			232	232	0	0.00%	0	0
111	1245		A	E						
137 in w/139 one cert #2 empty sig. Count	428		A	E	428				0	
139 in w/137 one cert #2 empty sig. Count	ROP		ROP	E						
162	535	535			535	533	0	0.00%	0	2
215	712	712			712	710	0	0.00%	0	2
257	526		A	E						
261/288	818	809			818	809	(9)	-1.10%	0	0
305/373	879	878			879	878	(1)	-0.11%	0	0
417/458	893	890			893	890	(3)	-0.34%	0	0
418	530	529			530	529	(1)	-0.19%	0	0
511	822	816			822	816	(6)	-0.73%	0	0
517	339	330			339	330	(9)	-2.65%	0	0
522/597	904	937		E	904		33	3.65%	0	
524/568	793	782			783	782	(11)	-1.39%	10	0
535	566	566		D	566		0	0.00%	0	
548	651		A	D	651				0	
576	833		A	D	833				0	
606	1192	1194			1192	1194	2	0.17%	0	0
717/794	923	7	B		923	923	(916)	-99.24%	0	(916)
722/726	1138	1138			1138	1138	0	0.00%	0	0
766/789	1367	1365			1365	1365	(2)	-0.15%	2	0
816	1116	834		F			(282)	-25.27%		
818	708	708			708	708	0	0.00%	0	0
828	944	947			944	947	3	0.32%	0	0
923 in w/951 one cert #2 empty sig. Count	475		A	D	475				0	
951 in w/923 one cert #2 empty sig. Count	ROP		ROP	D						
KEY										
"A" Signature count on Certificate No. 2 was left blank										
"B" Signature count on Certificate No. 2 contained an apparent clerical error										
"ROP" Reported with Other Precinct on Certificate No.2										
"C" observer noted - not allowed access to record data										
"D" observer noted - signatures not counted at all or count not observed										
"E" observer did not record some data										
"F" observer noted - pollworkers could not retrieve votes from one machine - it was removed from site by the ES										
"G" observer unable to get public count data										
							Voter Discrepancy		Variance in Ballots Cast btwn Observed and Site Sec Form	Variance in Cert. Sig. Count btwn Observed and Site Sec Form
							1295		12	921

**Table 4 - Comparing Certificate #2 with Ballots in Canvass
November 2, 2004 General Election
Miami-Dade County, Florida**

Precinct(s)	Registered Voters	Ballot Cast	Sigs from Cert #2's	Difference between Sig Count and Ballots Cast	% Difference above or below Sig Count from Cert #2	Notes
362	1634	563	859	296	34.46%	
117/166	2282	995	1276	281	22.02%	
213/294	2271	949	1181	232	19.64%	
11	1729	693	849	156	18.37%	
231	2022	924	1023	99	9.68%	
50	2003	1096	1190	94	7.90%	
428	1531	558	649	91	14.02%	
127	2762	1076	1158	82	7.08%	
742/788	3111	1411	1475	64	4.34%	
125	475	200	250	50	20.00%	
262/286	1696	687	737	50	6.78%	
322	3112	1342	1381	39	2.82%	
289/550	1776	823	861	38	4.41%	
339/380	3025	1172	1210	38	3.14%	
751	1388	593	629	36	5.72%	
263/282	2247	952	987	35	3.55%	
522/597	2357	904	937	33	3.52%	
905/906	4774	1867	1892	25	1.32%	
143/144	2823	1086	1106	20	1.81%	
560/972	2235	866	886	20	2.26%	
5	1882	847	864	17	1.97%	
705	2358	1019	1036	17	1.64%	
447	1649	640	656	16	2.44%	
424	2286	807	821	14	1.71%	
509	1520	661	675	14	2.07%	
519	1852	797	811	14	1.73%	
161/183	1395	582	595	13	2.18%	
920/935	1221	461	473	12	2.54%	
123	2375	988	999	11	1.10%	
326	3356	1366	1377	11	0.80%	
355/358	3036	1369	1379	10	0.73%	
360	2370	1103	1113	10	0.90%	
716/780	1392	646	656	10	1.52%	
247	1261	571	579	8	1.38%	
847	2233	992	1000	8	0.80%	
136/174	2369	939	946	7	0.74%	
402	6612	2597	2604	7	0.27%	
403	3206	1184	1191	7	0.59%	
429	1553	614	621	7	1.13%	
434	1924	839	846	7	0.83%	
545/997	2294	943	950	7	0.74%	
641/644	1269	556	563	7	1.24%	
902/941	2153	1007	1014	7	0.69%	
304/372	5141	2136	2142	6	0.28%	
311	2535	997	1003	6	0.60%	
345	1808	985	991	6	0.61%	
365	3795	1858	1864	6	0.32%	

**Table 4 - Comparing Certificate #2 with Ballots in Canvass
November 2, 2004 General Election
Miami-Dade County, Florida**

Precinct(s)	Registered Voters	Ballot Cast	Sigs from Cert #2's	Difference between Sig Count and Ballots Cast	% Difference above or below Sig Count from Cert #2	Notes
633	1450	685	691	6	0.87%	
703	3668	1504	1510	6	0.40%	
112	579	390	395	5	1.27%	
332/377	2473	981	986	5	0.51%	
728	2470	847	852	5	0.59%	
765	1880	712	717	5	0.70%	
774	1057	354	359	5	1.39%	
141/175	1595	601	605	4	0.66%	
188/268	1799	711	715	4	0.56%	
256	1799	760	764	4	0.52%	
409/460	1364	534	538	4	0.74%	
449	1255	506	510	4	0.78%	
640	1737	1078	1082	4	0.37%	
708/709	2293	974	978	4	0.41%	
724/777	2080	905	909	4	0.44%	
744/781	3269	1498	1502	4	0.27%	
749	1805	724	728	4	0.55%	
831	2650	937	941	4	0.43%	
212	1955	729	732	3	0.41%	
406	1814	644	647	3	0.46%	
430	2166	878	881	3	0.34%	
585/634	1235	589	592	3	0.51%	
586/635	1773	647	650	3	0.46%	
828	2454	944	947	3	0.32%	
836/853	2424	1143	1146	3	0.26%	
38	507	303	305	2	0.66%	
156	1623	825	827	2	0.24%	
267	1268	577	579	2	0.35%	
435	2105	774	776	2	0.26%	
440	1602	727	729	2	0.27%	
502/590	2023	765	767	2	0.26%	
521	2425	1080	1082	2	0.18%	
606	2853	1192	1194	2	0.17%	
622/652	1512	698	700	2	0.29%	
642/653	1086	542	544	2	0.37%	
702	3908	1942	1944	2	0.10%	
714	1881	803	805	2	0.25%	
721	3451	1442	1444	2	0.14%	
747	2255	970	972	2	0.21%	
793/796	3387	1470	1472	2	0.14%	
915	1934	793	795	2	0.25%	
919/939	1547	672	674	2	0.30%	
2	1031	457	458	1	0.22%	
13	1799	417	418	1	0.24%	
45	542	203	204	1	0.49%	
102/186	2858	835	836	1	0.12%	
129	2042	855	856	1	0.12%	

**Table 4 - Comparing Certificate #2 with Ballots in Canvass
November 2, 2004 General Election
Miami-Dade County, Florida**

Precinct(s)	Registered Voters	Ballot Cast	Sigs from Cert #2's	Difference between Sig Count and Ballots Cast	% Difference above or below Sig Count from Cert #2	Notes
131/132	2121	875	876	1	0.11%	
145	395	176	177	1	0.56%	
179/180	536	298	299	1	0.33%	
218	1606	686	687	1	0.15%	
301/369	1520	794	795	1	0.13%	
312	1653	748	749	1	0.13%	
314	1447	657	658	1	0.15%	
336/386	1860	720	721	1	0.14%	
346	1539	926	927	1	0.11%	
348/356	482	273	274	1	0.36%	
367/384	1550	830	831	1	0.12%	
426	1554	542	543	1	0.18%	
432	1544	645	646	1	0.15%	
510	804	326	327	1	0.31%	
529	2532	951	952	1	0.11%	
571/594	1537	700	701	1	0.14%	
582/973	2455	647	648	1	0.15%	
583	1201	504	505	1	0.20%	
636	1130	419	420	1	0.24%	
720	1826	865	866	1	0.12%	
755	1666	785	786	1	0.13%	
772	1974	848	849	1	0.12%	
821	2806	1218	1219	1	0.08%	
3	2425	1058	1058	0	0.00%	
7	1523	776	776	0	0.00%	
19	819	323	323	0	0.00%	
21	1243	368	368	0	0.00%	
27	803	301	301	0	0.00%	
30	2824	866	866	0	0.00%	
34	643	172	172	0	0.00%	
36	1578	609	609	0	0.00%	
37	767	286	286	0	0.00%	
43	594	254	254	0	0.00%	
53	59	24	24	0	0.00%	
104	1552	641	641	0	0.00%	
106	964	367	367	0	0.00%	
107	825	416	416	0	0.00%	
110	581	232	232	0	0.00%	
113	954	469	469	0	0.00%	
116	873	342	342	0	0.00%	
121/134	986	439	439	0	0.00%	
133/185	1281	535	535	0	0.00%	
138/170	1379	443	443	0	0.00%	
140/189	2258	798	798	0	0.00%	
147/176	1083	449	449	0	0.00%	
148	1669	616	616	0	0.00%	
150/164	1723	651	651	0	0.00%	

**Table 4 - Comparing Certificate #2 with Ballots in Canvass
November 2, 2004 General Election
Miami-Dade County, Florida**

Precinct(s)	Registered Voters	Ballot Cast	Sigs from Cert #2's	Difference between Sig Count and Ballots Cast	% Difference above or below Sig Count from Cert #2	Notes
153	2436	951	951	0	0.00%	
154	1259	543	543	0	0.00%	
157/181	1628	791	791	0	0.00%	
158	705	315	315	0	0.00%	
159	1607	780	780	0	0.00%	
162	1247	535	535	0	0.00%	
201	1684	759	759	0	0.00%	
204	842	399	399	0	0.00%	
209	2563	1122	1122	0	0.00%	
210	1420	736	736	0	0.00%	
211	735	318	318	0	0.00%	
215	1669	712	712	0	0.00%	
221	2233	889	889	0	0.00%	
223	1842	755	755	0	0.00%	
228	954	432	432	0	0.00%	
230/283	2073	833	833	0	0.00%	
237	1379	670	670	0	0.00%	
242	2373	1035	1035	0	0.00%	
248	2783	1058	1058	0	0.00%	
252	2487	1139	1139	0	0.00%	
255	755	360	360	0	0.00%	
259/278	1560	640	640	0	0.00%	
260	1164	560	560	0	0.00%	
265/280	829	388	388	0	0.00%	
271	237	104	104	0	0.00%	
273	1389	615	615	0	0.00%	
274	1425	618	618	0	0.00%	
284/285	1179	490	490	0	0.00%	
291	1040	397	397	0	0.00%	
292	1240	514	514	0	0.00%	
302	1581	777	777	0	0.00%	
307	1932	932	932	0	0.00%	
308	1213	514	514	0	0.00%	
309	3032	1395	1395	0	0.00%	
310	1990	784	784	0	0.00%	
316	1543	736	736	0	0.00%	
317	1377	602	602	0	0.00%	
321	2787	1241	1241	0	0.00%	
323	1620	716	716	0	0.00%	
324	1480	568	568	0	0.00%	
325	1327	578	578	0	0.00%	
327	1801	786	786	0	0.00%	
329/379	2252	1009	1009	0	0.00%	
334	1584	652	652	0	0.00%	
337	2532	1120	1120	0	0.00%	
338/383	2210	862	862	0	0.00%	
340/381	3403	1426	1426	0	0.00%	

**Table 4 - Comparing Certificate #2 with Ballots in Canvass
November 2, 2004 General Election
Miami-Dade County, Florida**

Precinct(s)	Registered Voters	Ballot Cast	Sigs from Cert #2's	Difference between Sig Count and Ballots Cast	% Difference above or below Sig Count from Cert #2	Notes
342/382	2410	1079	1079	0	0.00%	
343	2193	1083	1083	0	0.00%	
344	1874	1025	1025	0	0.00%	
347	1197	678	678	0	0.00%	
350/371	1356	585	585	0	0.00%	
364	1969	1006	1006	0	0.00%	
366	1117	601	601	0	0.00%	
368	2344	1150	1150	0	0.00%	
404	2714	1072	1072	0	0.00%	
405	1812	606	606	0	0.00%	
411/455	3342	1147	1147	0	0.00%	
414/457	3296	1534	1534	0	0.00%	
415	2753	1242	1242	0	0.00%	
423	1782	747	747	0	0.00%	
427	1557	528	528	0	0.00%	
431	1336	488	488	0	0.00%	
433	1804	790	790	0	0.00%	
436	2042	739	739	0	0.00%	
438	2455	835	835	0	0.00%	
441	2133	854	854	0	0.00%	
442	1184	367	367	0	0.00%	
443	1181	467	467	0	0.00%	
445/448	1702	602	602	0	0.00%	
450	1801	730	730	0	0.00%	
451	2006	979	979	0	0.00%	
454	743	291	291	0	0.00%	
505	1317	471	471	0	0.00%	
506	1128	380	380	0	0.00%	
513	717	330	330	0	0.00%	
523/976	1404	551	551	0	0.00%	
531/975	1414	548	548	0	0.00%	
535	1463	566	566	0	0.00%	
537/599	808	357	357	0	0.00%	
538/595	2301	932	932	0	0.00%	
542/985	2189	224	224	0	0.00%	
544/983	1576	675	675	0	0.00%	
547	2163	882	882	0	0.00%	
551	1470	542	542	0	0.00%	
552	594	238	238	0	0.00%	
556	2350	860	860	0	0.00%	
557/993	2249	751	751	0	0.00%	
561/578	3840	1505	1505	0	0.00%	
569/995	4351	1833	1833	0	0.00%	
573	2072	876	876	0	0.00%	
579	2650	1098	1098	0	0.00%	
581/998	971	367	367	0	0.00%	
589/987	112	38	38	0	0.00%	

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608	1838	798	798	0	0.00%	
613	1391	643	643	0	0.00%	
614	1006	440	440	0	0.00%	
615/619	2274	981	981	0	0.00%	
616	1283	548	548	0	0.00%	
617	2780	1079	1079	0	0.00%	
623/779	530	251	251	0	0.00%	
630	1427	587	587	0	0.00%	
706	2328	934	934	0	0.00%	
710	1684	784	784	0	0.00%	
711	2822	1169	1169	0	0.00%	
722/726	2621	1138	1138	0	0.00%	
723	1240	387	387	0	0.00%	
729	2019	761	761	0	0.00%	
732	1637	690	690	0	0.00%	
737	1539	607	607	0	0.00%	
740	2941	1293	1293	0	0.00%	
741	2454	1009	1009	0	0.00%	
743	1284	606	606	0	0.00%	
746	993	511	511	0	0.00%	
752	1739	741	741	0	0.00%	
760/761	1408	580	580	0	0.00%	
763	1968	759	759	0	0.00%	
768	394	182	182	0	0.00%	
769	1409	608	608	0	0.00%	
773	2471	1115	1115	0	0.00%	
818	1359	708	708	0	0.00%	
823	1346	595	595	0	0.00%	
824	3403	1322	1322	0	0.00%	
825	3376	1010	1010	0	0.00%	
826	774	355	355	0	0.00%	
829	983	395	395	0	0.00%	
830/848	694	329	329	0	0.00%	
832	1617	653	653	0	0.00%	
834/852	1908	866	866	0	0.00%	
835/845	2077	959	959	0	0.00%	
838	707	259	259	0	0.00%	
841	1495	581	581	0	0.00%	
846	1751	654	654	0	0.00%	
901/952	1597	745	745	0	0.00%	
904	1979	710	710	0	0.00%	
907/949	4132	1441	1441	0	0.00%	
908/944	209	64	64	0	0.00%	
909/946	2080	783	783	0	0.00%	
910	2571	976	976	0	0.00%	
911/931	3460	1249	1249	0	0.00%	
913/945	1967	863	863	0	0.00%	

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914	812	410	410	0	0.00%	
916/917	1591	570	570	0	0.00%	
921/930	262	101	101	0	0.00%	
922	2589	845	845	0	0.00%	
925/947	419	187	187	0	0.00%	
926/936	1107	452	452	0	0.00%	
927/929	305	113	113	0	0.00%	
928/932	286	127	127	0	0.00%	
933/953	1353	658	658	0	0.00%	
940/948	469	180	180	0	0.00%	
981/982	983	310	310	0	0.00%	
44	530	203	202	-1	-0.50%	
47/48	2068	825	824	-1	-0.12%	
101	2248	915	914	-1	-0.11%	
126	1562	704	703	-1	-0.14%	
128	1856	770	769	-1	-0.13%	
216	2387	1003	1002	-1	-0.10%	
225	2629	1142	1141	-1	-0.09%	
235	2983	1179	1178	-1	-0.08%	
270	2159	887	886	-1	-0.11%	
305/373	2398	879	878	-1	-0.11%	
341/555	2298	811	810	-1	-0.12%	
351	3215	1579	1578	-1	-0.06%	
354	1015	444	443	-1	-0.23%	
385	2321	989	988	-1	-0.10%	
407	1356	520	519	-1	-0.19%	
408	2896	1073	1072	-1	-0.09%	
418	1564	530	529	-1	-0.19%	
419	1239	380	379	-1	-0.26%	
422	1271	532	531	-1	-0.19%	
518	1848	774	773	-1	-0.13%	
532	545	243	242	-1	-0.41%	
546	1095	386	385	-1	-0.26%	
602	1382	502	501	-1	-0.20%	
603	1398	581	580	-1	-0.17%	
770	603	270	269	-1	-0.37%	
991/992	1358	325	324	-1	-0.31%	
4	1392	636	634	-2	-0.32%	
26/28	1393	607	605	-2	-0.33%	
103	2558	567	565	-2	-0.35%	
130	3058	1153	1151	-2	-0.17%	
243	1881	819	817	-2	-0.24%	
303/370	2548	1228	1226	-2	-0.16%	
319	1168	545	543	-2	-0.37%	
335	1676	761	759	-2	-0.26%	
361/375	955	440	438	-2	-0.46%	
412/456	3514	1515	1513	-2	-0.13%	

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420	2086	752	750	-2	-0.27%	
421	2723	973	971	-2	-0.21%	
503/990	917	421	419	-2	-0.48%	
553	1820	604	602	-2	-0.33%	
563	1855	675	673	-2	-0.30%	
565	2161	676	674	-2	-0.30%	
601	1613	654	652	-2	-0.31%	
618/645	1214	550	548	-2	-0.36%	
704	2043	880	878	-2	-0.23%	
707	680	351	349	-2	-0.57%	
766/789	3111	1367	1365	-2	-0.15%	
815	1506	647	645	-2	-0.31%	
918	1253	444	442	-2	-0.45%	
18	1844	623	620	-3	-0.48%	
152/178	1534	624	621	-3	-0.48%	
272	1863	806	803	-3	-0.37%	
333/376	1557	558	555	-3	-0.54%	
417/458	2664	893	890	-3	-0.34%	
508/979	2269	991	988	-3	-0.30%	
541/984	1306	520	517	-3	-0.58%	
554	1577	491	488	-3	-0.61%	
570	1479	573	570	-3	-0.53%	
572	1290	560	557	-3	-0.54%	
574	2000	761	758	-3	-0.40%	
587	1774	610	607	-3	-0.49%	
593/988	1061	450	447	-3	-0.67%	
839/849	1587	519	516	-3	-0.58%	
912/943	462	235	232	-3	-1.29%	
9 /10	2977	1275	1271	-4	-0.31%	
20/22	644	176	172	-4	-2.33%	
31	521	179	175	-4	-2.29%	
32	1798	579	575	-4	-0.70%	
35	933	291	287	-4	-1.39%	
40	1486	595	591	-4	-0.68%	
241	1752	765	761	-4	-0.53%	
251	1470	675	671	-4	-0.60%	
264/287	1453	617	613	-4	-0.65%	
410	3332	1344	1340	-4	-0.30%	
452	3273	1459	1455	-4	-0.27%	
611/638	1868	693	689	-4	-0.58%	
701	2465	1023	1019	-4	-0.39%	
734/785	1844	847	843	-4	-0.47%	
775	3614	1563	1559	-4	-0.26%	
39	1461	623	618	-5	-0.81%	
49/52	1579	833	828	-5	-0.60%	
220	1760	750	745	-5	-0.67%	
416	2708	905	900	-5	-0.56%	

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584	1607	716	711	-5	-0.70%	
624/625	1690	700	695	-5	-0.72%	
762	4613	1601	1596	-5	-0.31%	
149/169	2283	790	784	-6	-0.77%	
266/281	218	61	55	-6	-10.91%	
511	1769	822	816	-6	-0.74%	
745/783	2881	1227	1221	-6	-0.49%	
978	995	307	301	-6	-1.99%	
8	1119	512	505	-7	-1.39%	
233/276	1644	753	746	-7	-0.94%	
253	1301	590	583	-7	-1.20%	
605/610	2193	741	734	-7	-0.95%	
738	2459	965	958	-7	-0.73%	
819	1149	477	470	-7	-1.49%	
109	2884	809	801	-8	-1.00%	
115	2605	1147	1139	-8	-0.70%	
764	5714	2465	2457	-8	-0.33%	
33	1012	349	340	-9	-2.65%	
203	2373	1109	1100	-9	-0.82%	
214	2461	1060	1051	-9	-0.86%	
234/269	2645	1138	1129	-9	-0.80%	
261/288	2053	818	809	-9	-1.11%	
320	2500	1049	1040	-9	-0.87%	
363/374	1767	804	795	-9	-1.13%	
517	1201	339	330	-9	-2.73%	
224	2124	869	859	-10	-1.16%	
401/446	2949	949	939	-10	-1.06%	
564	1782	526	516	-10	-1.94%	
739	2949	1086	1076	-10	-0.93%	
315	1849	861	850	-11	-1.29%	
524/568	1981	793	782	-11	-1.41%	
46	1736	594	582	-12	-2.06%	
352	5046	2424	2411	-13	-0.54%	
715	2078	886	872	-14	-1.61%	
51	1952	1164	1149	-15	-1.31%	
713	2206	846	831	-15	-1.81%	
562	2650	941	925	-16	-1.73%	
165	704	317	298	-19	-6.38%	
226	2001	933	914	-19	-2.08%	
767	2344	932	913	-19	-2.08%	
142	2695	866	846	-20	-2.36%	
735	2053	922	902	-20	-2.22%	
425	1950	720	698	-22	-3.15%	
219	1273	620	596	-24	-4.03%	
328	2284	962	937	-25	-2.67%	
620/651	1791	810	778	-32	-4.11%	
245	1620	811	776	-35	-4.51%	

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146	2246	1067	1030	-37	-3.59%	
258	1070	490	438	-52	-11.87%	
41	1950	910	848	-62	-7.31%	
1	2155	965	880	-85	-9.66%	
543/989	2673	925	838	-87	-10.38%	
520	1803	766	669	-97	-14.50%	
353/453	3833	1515	1415	-100	-7.07%	
816	2376	1116	834	-282	-33.81%	
250	1303	590	3	-587	-19566.67%	B
217	1987	888	188	-700	-372.34%	B
108	1931	874	8	-866	-10825.00%	B
717/794	2288	923	7	-916	-13085.71%	B
124	2789	1301	17	-1284	-7552.94%	B

Key: B - Apparent Clerical Error

The following 75 polling places returned the Certificate #2 form with the signature line left blank:

23, 25, 29, 42, 105, 111, 118, 119, 137 & 139, 151 & 177, 155, 173 & 240, 184, 202 & 290, 205, 206, 207 & 293, 208, 222, 227, 229, 232 & 275, 236 & 313, 244, 246 & 277, 249 & 279, 254, 257, 306, 330 & 378, 331, 349, 357, 359, 413 & 459, 437, 439, 444, 501 & 580, 504 & 592, 507, 512 & 596, 515, 525 & 527, 526 & 986, 533, 548, 566, 567 & 996, 576, 591 & 598, 604, 607 & 637, 612 & 639, 626 & 648, 712, 718 & 778, 719 & 795, 725, 727, 730, 731, 733, 736, 748 & 786, 750 & 787, 753, 771, 791, 822, 827 & 851, 833 & 843, 903 & 942, 923 & 951, 924 & 950, 937 & 938