VerifiedVoting.org voiced strong opposition to voting technology legislation by Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Senator Robert Bennett (R-UT). Today the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration held a hearing on the bill, S.3212. “The show-stoppers in this bill unfortunately overshadow its positive provisions,” said Verified Voting president Pamela Smith.

S.3212 fails to require a physical, voter-verifiable record of votes cast. Instead, it calls for an “independent record” of votes that could be electronic, paper, audio, video, pictorial, or “other” -- while exempting some systems altogether. The bill would not require states to use these independent records in a recount or a post-election audit of vote tallies.To be meaningful for audits or recounts, a verification record must be presented to the voter for verification before the ballot is cast, and not be alterable by a failure or manipulation of computer software. A voter-verified paper ballot is the only system that today effectively serves that purpose.

“This bill is likely to increase the cost of elections without solving the problem of voter confidence,” Smith said. “It misses a key point; since 2000, more jurisdictions have used paper ballot systems than any other voting system. And states and counties are continuing to choose those cost-effective and reliable voter-marked paper ballot systems to replace their more expensive, complex e-voting systems. The exemptions in the bill allow unverifiable systems to remain, and that means unverifiable elections indefinitely. It doesn’t accomplish the goal.”

In addition, the bill's language leaves room for debate about whether or not the various types of independent records would be verified by the voter before the voter casts a ballot. “Federal lawmakers have been working on election verification bills for five years,” said Warren Stewart, VerifiedVoting.org's Senior Project Director. “The starting point is voter-verifiability of the verification record, which this legislation doesn't require. This bill could remove the voter from the act of verification.”

S.3212's provision for “independent” electronic records is of particular concern. “This bill invites the development of paperless electronic voting systems, when there are no government certification processes to protect the voters from insecure voting systems. New, insecure systems will be sold as a result,” said David Dill, a Stanford University computer scientist and founder of Verified Voting.

VerifiedVoting.org has issued a public statement describing a number of serious deficiencies in S.3212. “The bill would spend money without increasing voter confidence or ensuring reliable, accessible transparent elections,” said Smith. “Voters deserve better.”