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Home » News » Breaking News » Statement re: Manager's Amendment
Statement re: Manager's Amendment
August 1st, 2007
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The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 (HR 811) has been scheduled for a floor vote this week. The bill that will come to a vote will reflect changes made since the bill was reported favorably out of the Committee on House Administration in May.
You can download the HR 811 "Manager's Mark" here.
Information regarding the earlier version of the bill as reported out of the Committee on House Administration on May 8, including links to the text of that version and to the Committee's formal report, can be found here.
The following is Verified Voting's statement on the manager's amendment to HR 811.
The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2007 (HR 811) will likely be voted on soon. The bill that will come to a vote will reflect changes made since the bill was reported favorably out of the Committee on House Administration in May.
The most basic elements of the bill remain intact – 2008 requirements for paper ballots as an independent means of verifying electronic vote tabulation, random mandatory audits, disclosure of voting system software, tighter security of electronic voting systems, emergency paper ballots in case of machine failures, provision of funding to enable jurisdictions to upgrade to accessibly verifiable paper-based voting systems, and the establishment of an arm's length between voting machine vendors and testing laboratories. These reforms are important, and must be enacted as soon as possible. Therefore VerifiedVoting.org continues to support H.R. 811.
We also would strongly support a phase-out of the use of DREs in Federal elections by a date certain -- one that provides time for an orderly transition to optical scan voting systems augmented by accessible ballot marking devices. Such an amendment would enable all jurisdictions in the country to employ voting systems using paper ballots marked by the voter, either directly, or through use of such an assistive device as needed.
On July 27, 2007, reports released by the California Secretary of State stated that current generation direct recording electronic (DRE) voting machines are “substantially non-compliant” with the accessibility requirements of the Help America Vote Act, and that current generation DRE paper ballot (VVPAT) printers are themselves vulnerable to hacks unique to such systems. Of greatest concern are the printer hacks that would not be detectable even in the event of a hand audit using the printed paper records – this defeats the entire purpose of having a voter-verified paper audit mechanism.
On the same day, modifications to H.R. 811 were confirmed via a Manager’s Amendment that would permit (though not require) both continued use and new deployments of current generation DREs and VVPAT printers. That amendment could negatively impact what voting technology states may use to cast and count votes, potentially decreasing reliability while not necessarily increasing accessibility.
Earlier the bill required that currently paperless jurisdictions use durable, individual paper ballots in the 2008 election. This had the effect of moving those jurisdictions toward optical scan paper ballot systems used in conjunction with assistive ballot-marking devices (OS/BMD). We have always strongly supported such systems for their transparency, reliability, cost-effectiveness, ease of use by both voters and poll workers, and in the case of ballot-marking devices, for their accessibility. Ballot marking systems, which are used in more than half the states, offer durable, individual paper ballots, accessible verification of such ballots, and a range of input options to address the accessibility needs of various voters.
The bill’s funding allows jurisdictions to move toward OS/BMD, but moving the date for the durable paper ballot standard to 2012 risks delay in the deployment of truly auditable and accessible elections for many Americans. Some jurisdictions will do the right thing and choose durable paper for 2008. We feel strongly that no jurisdiction should spend any more money on unreliable current generation DRE and VVPAT printer technology.
It is obvious from the many serious security and accessibility failures uncovered by the California Secretary of State Voting System Review that DREs should not be used to cast and count votes in our elections. Phasing out the use of DREs in Federal elections would reduce any incentive to buy them.
A more detailed analysis of the Proposed Changes, and Verified Voting’s concerns about them, follows.
1. In Section 2(b)(1)”(B)(i), we can accept that the language allowing “mechanisms that provide voters with the option of automatically placing the ballot into a secure container for subsequent counting” would allow current ballot marking devices to continue to be used with reasonable modifications. We are concerned, however, that the inclusion of specific language prohibiting systems that require the voter to handle the ballot could have a prejudicial effect on subsequent interpretation and could have a chilling effect on the purchase of ballot marking devices. As introduced, the bill already required that the “entire process” of verification and casting be made accessible, without using language that might tend to deter the purchase of ballot marking devices.
2. We support the goal of accessible ballot verification. However, wording inserted into Section 2(a)(3) of the bill specifically grants to a named private entity a consulting role, thus granting it unfettered influence over the EAC's decision-making process. The bill does include a separate provision that terminates the EAC’s no-bid contracting process, but this section would appear to circumvent the requirement for competitive bid for this particular entity. If passed as currently written, the legislation will grant primary influence over the EAC's determination of what systems are deemed “accessible” and required for purchase and deployment in every jurisdiction in the country to one private organization without any oversight or accountability.
3. The specifications for the purpose of HAVA Section 297 Grants for research on development of election-dedicated voting system software have been removed. We understand that, with respect to this software research, changes requested by the Science Committee were accepted to expedite the process of moving the bill forward. However, we do not understand why it seemed necessary to delete the requirement that the research be directed toward the development of voting system software that was “easily understandable” and written exclusively for the purpose of conducting elections under the requirements of the bill. We would prefer to see those original positive goals reinserted.
Funding Mechanism
The funding provisions of Section 2(d) have been re-written. The authorization of $1 billion as determined by the Committee based on detailed research presented in hearings has now been allocated without any reference to the new requirements that would take effect in 2008 as compared to 2012. An open-ended authorization for "such sums as necessary" has been added for fiscal year 2009. What had been one payment of $1 billion and dedicated to meeting all of the highest standards in the bill as expeditiously as possible has been turned into two payments - $1 billion to purchase in 2008 any system that includes a voter verified paper ballot, including those voting systems and printers that the bill will explicitly prohibit in 2012. As reported out of committee, the bill established standards of durability and accessibility for ballot verification and wisely authorized funds for the purchase of equipment that met those standards. The proposed changes allow the purchase of precisely the equipment that the bill as introduced and as reported out of committee would have replaced, and on top of that would expect taxpayers to then foot the bill for replacing it again four years later.
If DREs are phased out and/or durability were again made mandatory in the paperless jurisdictions for 2008 as in the Committee mark, and the upgrade deadline was 2012 as in the Manager’s, no funds would be wasted, and ample time would be allowed for upgrades in the jurisdictions that are already voting on unreliable but otherwise HAVA-compliant, auditable systems. To solve a perception of an unfunded mandate, the funds should be allocated to first go where needed to meet the basic standards of the bill.
Definition of Election-Dedicated Software
The intention of the software disclosure provision in H.R. 811 is to allow qualified persons access to the underlying mechanism through which votes are counted in electronic voting systems in order to resolve concerns about the proper functioning of those systems. In a last minute change, however, a definition of "voting system software" was chosen from the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines. While this no doubt seemed to be a reasonable source for a definition of voting system software, the definition does not mention “source code.” Such an omission would severely limit the use of software disclosure precisely in the most critical situations anticipated in the bill - pre-election and post-election challenges and criminal litigation. Indeed, the Committee Report indicates that it was the intention of the Committee to correct the last-minute change and to ensure that the disclosure language be broad and allow access to all materials, including source code, that qualified persons would need for such a task. While the Committee Report language demonstrates the true intent of the Committee, the software disclosure requirement should be set forth in the bill text.
The intent of the software disclosure language in the legislation would be more strongly maintained by including, as set forth in the Committee Report, the elements outlined in section 5.4-5.9 of the Voting System Testing and Certification Program Manual, Version 1.0, which would allow limited disclosure of source code, the build environment, executable code and any installation devices and file signatures to install the code on devices and reasonably verify its provenance. This is precisely what manufacturers will be required to disclose in the testing process anyway under the new certification program, and it is reasonable to require such disclosure in the circumstances described in the bill.
Conclusion
The bill reported out of committee enjoyed the co-sponsorship of over 200 bipartisan members of Congress and the support of national and state election integrity organizations; it also supported the nation-wide trend towards OS/BMD. The funding was directed towards existing and emerging technologies to provide the most reliable, accurate, and cost-effective voting systems, while requiring features which would enable voters with disabilities to verify the accuracy of their ballots. The proposed changes to the Committee bill open the door for hundreds of millions to be spent on touch screen equipment and flawed inaccessible printers in 2008 -- equipment that would need to be replaced yet again in 2012 -- but that problem is mitigated by a DRE phase-out amendment. Such an amendment would deter the expenditures on soon to be obsolete equipment.
We believe the good in the bill outweighs the changes, and we urge Congress to implement these reasonable corrections as the bill moves forward. |
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