The State of New Jersey passed a law in July 2005 requiring voter-verified paper records for direct recording electronic (DRE) voting systems by January of 2008. Most of the systems in use in the state at the time the bill was signed into law had no available printer with which the counties could retrofit. However, when the market demands, vendors typically will find a way to comply.

Last week New Jersey reported on tests of three printers submitted for consideration to meet the states requirements. Two were from Sequoia -- one for the Advantage electronic voting machines used in most of the State's jurisdictions, and one for the newer Edge e-voting machines used in Salem County . The third printer tested was for Avante. The Sequoia Advantage printer does "cut-and-drop" of the paper record into a secure receptacle, as does the Avante. The Edge printer does not cut the records into separate sheets. The Advantage printers are said to come at a price tag of some $2000 apiece -- this may or may not take into consideration the cost of additional system retrofits to allow the printers to be attached.

The State found a number of exceptions -- areas in which the printers, in their determination, did not comply fully with the requirements as stated. There were several which are of concern, and at least one which should render the system unusable.

The biggest problem could be one that may not look like much, at first glance. The requirement is for the DRE system to stop recording votes if the paper malfunctions, jams, the connection between DRE and printer is lost, etc. In such an instance, the voter is allowed to vote on a different system or on an emergency paper ballot. The testers indicated exceptions for at least one system, as follows:

"If a mechanical error or malfunction occurs (such as a paper jam, running out of paper, paper torn in half, or paper inserted improperly), the DRE displays an error message on the screen to the voter, but no warning signals are sent to notify the election officials at the polling place. The DRE does not suspend voting operations. The voter has the opportunity to continue voting and cast the vote but the paper record is not printed. The vote is, however, electronically recorded."

"Although the DRE can detect problems that may prevent paper records from being correctly displayed, printed, or stored (like paper jams or low paper), no warning signals are sent to notify the election officials at the polling place."

"Since no further amendment of the vote is possible under the Regulations, an opportunity to confirm the third choice is irrelevant and superfluous."

Thus the one OFFICIAL record of your vote to be used in recounts and audits may or may not be printed correctly, but you don't get to check.

It's of deep concern that this vendor's representation seems not to grasp the significance of the voter-verified paper record. It's not (just) to make voters feel better about the voting system, it's there to provide a way to check the tally for accuracy. Failure to make it available to the voter for review eliminates that failsafe.

When using a paper ballot, you, the voter, get to decide when you're ready to cast it -- the equipment doesn't snatch it away before you get to review it.

These concerns, coupled with the cost of the printers, bring to mind a serious issue. New Jersey spent, as best we can calculate, somewhere between $70 and $90 million for these systems, when you add in the cost of the printers. They spent this money on a system which does not provide dual switch input for voters with disabilities relating to mobility and manual dexterity. They spent it on a system which does not provide audio readback from the paper ballot for voters with visual disabilities who want to be able to review their ballot for accuracy.¹ They spent it on a system known to have higher than usual residual vote rates.²

They could have had paper optical scan ballots and ballot-marking devices in every polling place for 1/2 to 1/3 of that cost, around $34.5 million. Don't throw good money after bad, New Jersey. It's still not too late.

1. The NJIT reports indicated that the systems must meet Federal and State standards for accessibility, which shall include, but are not limited to, an audio component that shall accurately relay the information printed on the paper ballot to the voter. However, the methodology for testing to this standard is merely to run a mock election to check the accuracy of the information printed in that particular mock election. It does not seek to ensure that the audio stream relay the information from the paper itself. Thus a voter who is unable to visually review the paper record in an actual election is only able to audibly review the electronic record and has no way to know if the paper was printed correctly.

2. The residual vote rate on bottom-of-ticket items was a stunning five times higher on NJ’s full-face DREs than on paging DREs in a recent study. Even a highly publicized top of ticket Senate race showed a full percentage point worse performance on the full-face DREs.