I. VV Comments - US
House of Representatives Hearing on Voting Systems Guidelines; Verified Voting
submits testimony; Take Action on HR550
II. News Briefs - Arizona newest state to adopt verifiable voting, Voting
System Security report released, more...
I. Hearing -
On July 19, the Administration Committee and the Science
Committee of the US House of Representatives held a joint hearing to review the
Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG) required by the Help America Vote Act
(HAVA). Verified Voting submitted an expanded version of the following testimony
(full version available at http://verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6376 ).
There is a crisis of confidence today in the electronic voting systems used
across our nation. It grows each day as the public gains awareness of their
inadequacies and vulnerabilities. The concern is perhaps greatest among those
with technical understanding of the computing systems that control the voting
equipment.
There will be those who say that system problems can be solved with a set of
procedures. But a procedural fix cannot solve a system problem.
The current guidelines do not resolve the current crisis.
First, the process for voting system certification is wholly insufficient for
security.
Second, voluntary guidelines, no matter how well written, cannot secure a
broken system. Voting systems cannot be made secure without the essential
safeguard of a voter-verified paper record (VVPR) of every vote and mandatory
random manual audits of these paper records to ensure the accuracy of the vote
count.
Third, the most significant thing the current VVSG could have done to bolster
the public’s confidence was not done. On January 18, 2005, Professor Ron Rivest
introduced a resolution (#13-05) to require VVPR at a Technical Guidelines
Development Committee (TGDC) meeting where voting system standards were being
drafted. Professor Rivest is the member of the TGDC with by far the greatest
expertise in computer security. That resolution was voted down, by members of
the committee who know less about computer security than the person who
introduced the measure. Just as the Food and Drug Administration would not
approve of a pharmaceutical based on a vote where accountants out-voted
physicians, it is important that decisions affecting technical requirements be
made by technical experts.
Finally, now that the lion’s share of HAVA equipment funding has been spent,
the VVSG serve only as a theoretical or philosophical guideline for what you
would want in a voting system, if one were going to buy a new one today... but
almost no one is buying now.
Verified Voting makes the following recommendations:
1. Prevent Unrecoverable Lost Votes; Mandate VVPR and Audits
With each
election, new examples arise of situations where votes were irretrievably lost,
but could have been recovered if a VVPR requirement were in place. Only such a
requirement can prevent losses of votes due to malfunction, programming error,
set-up error, or tampering.
2. Accelerate VVSG Update Process
These voluntary guidelines do not take
effect until December 2007. The lag between their development and their
effective date almost ensures that they will be obsolete by the time they are in
effect. They offer too little, too late.
3. Certification Process Should Not Be Cloaked in Secrecy
The scheme
remains one in which private voting system vendors contract with (and pay for)
private testing laboratories to carry out certification testing in secret.
Public confidence in the integrity of certification will not be achieved if
testing continues to be carried out behind a veil of secrecy. The EAC should
require that, as a condition of certification, the report produced be publicly
released, along with the technical data package.
4. Stronger Security Testing
Any certification system that subjects
voting systems to hundreds of hours of expensive "testing" and yet fails to
discover grave security vulnerabilities which can be successfully exploited in a
manner of minutes is completely ineffective. Security evaluations should be
conducted by experts not chosen by the vendors, and those experts should be
allowed to do open-ended research on possible attacks.
5. Proprietary Interests Should Not Outweigh Security and Performance
Requirements
The current (and future) certification scheme appears to be
biased in favor of maintaining the proprietary interests of voting machine
vendors rather than ensuring the integrity of the voting systems. An example is
the inclusion of wireless networking, which facilitates vendor interests but is
unnecessary and inherently unsafe, and should be banned outright.
6. Encourage (Secure) Usability Advances.
The current practice of
certifying whole voting systems has the potential to stifle the independent
development of add-ons to existing voting systems that could greatly enhance
usability, especially accessibility.
7. Address Defects Discovered After Deployment
When defects in other
types of products affect public safety, product recalls are initiated and
product defects corrected at vendor expense, but we have no clear mechanism for
decertifying defective voting systems that put our elections at risk.
Need for Prompt Action
On June 24, 2004, Dr. Michael Shamos, a faculty member at Carnegie Mellon
University who serves as statutory examiner of voting systems for Pennsylvania,
testified to the House Science Committee that the system for testing and
certifying voting equipment in this country "is not only broken, but is
virtually nonexistent. It must be re-created from scratch or we will never
restore public confidence in elections."
Two years later, little has changed. Instead of making that process
"transparent, easily-understood" and "viewable" by the public, the revised
guidelines leave intact the existing opaque and secretive system which Professor
Shamos describes as "grotesque." That system can continue no longer. It must be
made transparent. It is time for Congress to act to safeguard our elections.
***
NOTE: Two days after the hearing, the number of co-sponsors for
the leading bill requiring audits and VVPR for all voting systems used in
federal elections passed the 200 mark. HR 550, sponsored by Rep. Holt (D-NJ),
now has 201 bi-partisan co-sponsors in the US House. A few more co-sponsors are
needed for passage. Verified Voting needs a minute of your time for a final push
to get HR 550 passed. Please visit the VerifiedVoting.org Action Center to send
a message to your lawmaker today: http://www.democracyinaction.org/dia/organizations/vevo/campaign.jsp?campaign_KEY=395
II. News Briefs
On June 28, Arizona became the 28th state to pass a VVPR requirement, and the
13th to mandate manual audits, when Arizona Governor Napolitano signed SB 1557
into law. The bill, sponsored by Rep. Ted Downing (D-Tucson) and Sen. Karen
Johnson (R-Mesa), passed the Arizona House unanimously, then passed in the
Senate 25 to 3. The law requires each electronic voting machine to produce a
voter-verified paper record of every vote, and mandates a hand-counted audit in
2% of precincts, with expansion of the hand count if discrepancies are found.
Our congratulations and gratitude go out to Arizona's election integrity
advocates and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. http://verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6375
In June the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of
Law published a comprehensive analysis of voting system security which concludes
that the easiest of several ways to subvert a computerized voting system is to
install corrupt software, and that there are no strong defenses without
voter-verified paper trails. The report was the focus of a staff briefing on
Capitol Hill on June 28. The good news: effective countermeasures are available.
Will your jurisdiction be using them? Specific recommendations included
requiring random audits of voter-verified paper records, and banning the use of
wireless networking. For more information and a link to the report, see
http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6371
Cindy Cohn, member of the Verified Voting Board of Directors and legal
director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (eff.org), was recently named one of the 100 most influential
lawyers in the United States by the National Law Journal, which highlighted her
work supporting activists challenging unverifiable electronic voting machines in
Maryland, California, Texas, Ohio, and New Jersey. Congratulations, Cindy! http://law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1150362316389
El Nuevo Herald, Miami's premiere Spanish-language newspaper, covers issues
relating to electronic voting at length in an in-depth interview with Verified
Voting Founder, computer scientist David Dill, in its July 2 issue. Please pass
it along to your Spanish-speaking friends and associates. You can find the
article, entitled "Votacion electronica puede ser manipulada" ("E-voting can be
manipulated") here: http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6373
On June 12, the League of Women Voters of the United States, the oldest
election integrity organization in the country, passed a resolution in support
of VVPR and mandatory random manual audits of voting systems nationwide. The
support of this venerable non-partisan organization represents an enormous step
forward for election integrity.
http://verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6363
The June 2006 oversight hearing of the Election Assistance Commission (EAC),
conducted by the US House of Representatives Committee on Administration,
resulted in some very interesting questions and responses on voting system
issues, so Verified Voting published analysis and commentary. We emphasize the
urgent need to establish nationwide requirements for voter-verified paper
records on all voting systems and for mandatory manual audits of those records
in all federal and state elections. More here: http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/article.php?id=6374
VerifiedVoting.org launches a new home page ( http://verifiedvoting.org ). The home page now features a map
that identifies states with a VVPR requirement, states with VVPR and routine
manual audits, and states with neither. 28 states currently have a VVPR, but
only 13 states require a mandatory manual audit. Verified Voting needs your help
to push for both.
In this phase of our campaign for verifiable elections, we are urging every
voting jurisdiction with voter-verifiable paper ballots -- state, county,
parish, district or township -- to carry out an audit after every election to
check the vote count for accuracy. If you want to get an audit requirement
passed in your state, contact us -- we'll be happy to help.
###
Verified Voting Foundation
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San Francisco, CA 94103
415-487-2255
telephone
info@verifiedvoting.org
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