Recently allegations of shortcomings in the "Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act" -- HR550, introduced by Rep. Rush Holt of New Jersey -- have been circulated, moments before citizens concerned about verifiable elections nationwide converge on Washington DC to lobby for this particular bill.

The concerns about the legislation are generally unfounded. HR550 remains the "gold standard" of voter-verified paper record (VVPR) legislation, the only one with bi-partisan support and the only one to require mandatory random manual audits that would check for accuracy in every state. The organizations that support it, which run the gamut from partisan at both extremes to non-partisan election reform organizations, do so because it is clear that this legislation would go the furthest to improve election integrity nationwide. Despite the fact that 27 states have passed requirements in one form or another for voter-verified paper records, and another handful have purchased 100% voter-verifiable equipment statewide even without passing a requirement, the sad fact remains that much of our country still lacks a voter-verified paper record and fully three-quarters of the states lack any requirement to audit their elections for accuracy!

In short, HR550 is the best VVPR legislation and has earned the support of those who are concerned about election integrity nationwide.

Does HR550 Allow for Paper Ballots?
The article implies that the Holt bill calls for a "direct recording electronic (DRE) machine + voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) printer" solution, which it does not. Nothing in HR550 precludes any town, county or state from using a paper ballot system, as such a system is inherently voter-verifiable.

It is a fact that many jurisdictions won't easily give up DREs. Despite the many wise reasons that exist for some currently all-DRE states or counties to switch to paper optical scan ballot systems (cost-savings, ease of operation, voter-verifiability), getting that to happen is a long shot. One big reason is that those jurisdictions get to make their own choices about voting systems, in general. HAVA can't make you buy a DRE; the EAC can't take away your paper ballot; and the Holt bill doesn't make you choose either one. (It simply says that whatever voting system you use, it must be voter-verifiable, and therefore auditable.)

So making existing DREs auditable is crucial. Saying so implies no preference for DREs. It simply acknowledges that some jurisdictions have them at this time.

Can the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) Do Selective Recounts?
The article mixes "recounts" with "audits" -- but there's a large difference. Audits provide for regular checks on accuracy of machines that tally our votes. Recounts are used to confirm the results of a particular race, either in a challenge situation or in automatic recount situations resulting from a trigger margin (e.g. less than 0.5%, in some states).

In Holt's HR550, there is a specified percentage for the mandatory manual accuracy check... it is not intended to be a "limited recount" a la Gore v. Bush. HR550 mandates random audits in at least 2% of the precincts in each State, including at least one per county. The EAC may not pick and choose where it will conduct audits, nor of how great or small a portion of the state. What's more, the States may not select where those audits can be, and will not know where they will take place until after the initial vote tallies are done and reported. The bill insists that all precincts in a State "have an equal chance of being selected."

One scenario in the article suggests that a Governor could ask the EAC to do a recount (and in doing so "fix" the outcome); this is not true. It is not part of the EAC's rights nor responsibilities to carry out recounts. Each State is responsible for its own recounts. HR550 does not address recount laws.

The author also suggests that there would be "litigation, litigation" if the mandatory manual audits of 2% showed a possible discrepancy. In fact, what would happen is a wider audit to clarify the extent of the discrepant results, and to determine whether there would be a change in outcome.

Would HR550 Somehow Consolidate Power in the EAC?
Despite the article's claims to the contrary, HR550 clearly defines the parameters of the EAC's powers on the issues in question. In fact, it makes one very specific improvement with regard to the audit provision, which the article's author has said should be stricken: HAVA originally exempted the EAC from having to do public bidding for contracts. Since HR550 mandates that the EAC conduct audits, and with four commissioners, the EAC obviously cannot do audits without contracting with outside entities, HR550 revokes that exemption. When HR550 passes, all EAC contracts have to go through public bidding processes, including contracts for doing State audits. That means organizations like the one to which the author of the article belongs could submit bids to carry out the audits in their States. Concerned about how audits are done? You could be the one to do the audit. But only if Holt's bill passes.

The EAC lacks regulatory power and rulemaking authority. It cannot "postpone" elections. It cannot institute election "laws" that would effect the results of the 2006 elections. And HR550 does nothing to change that. The EAC, an independent agency, took over the duties of a pre-existing entity -- the Office of Election Administration -- which was part of the Federal Election Commission (FEC). HAVA adds some oversight and standards-development responsibilities to what the OEA was already doing. It has no "broad executive powers" as the article suggested. Per Section 205 of HAVA, the EAC can

(1) hold hearings;
(2) obtain information from other agencies (such as the FEC) as needed in order to carry out provisions of the Act;
(3) send mail; and
(4) engage in contracts.

HAVA says explicitly (in Section 209) that the EAC "shall not have any authority to issue any rule, promulgate any regulation, or take any other action which imposes any requirement on any State or unit of local government" other than as already authorized under the National Voting Rights Act. And nothing in HR550 changes that fact. The recent article, mentioned by the author, from electionline.org discussing Arizona talks about matters relating to the NVRA which are separate from the rest of the EAC's responsibilities and rights, because they stem from what was already authorized in relation to that Act, separate from HAVA.

What Does HR550 Say About the Voting System Guidelines?
The article discusses issues relating to the voluntary voting system guidelines (VVSG). Some points are valid, some miss the mark, but the issue is overall unrelated to HR550, except for a key point. HR550 does what the guidelines cannot: establish a requirement for a voter-verified paper record for EVERY voting system nationwide. HR550 does what the guidelines have failed to do: prohibit the use of undisclosed software and wireless communications devices in voting systems.

First, some background: the VVSG are voluntary. A state may choose to adopt these guidelines in full, in part, or not at all. Once a State decides to adopt the guidelines, ensuring that they follow those provisions is up to the State. The EAC has oversight for these standards.

Assume for a moment that the VVSG included a "requirement" for a voter-verified paper record. Only those states which choose to adhere to the voluntary guidelines would then have to deploy a VVPR. The rest would not. When HR550 passes, ALL states would have to deploy a VVPR. No exceptions--regardless of any State's position on the VVSG.

In section 2.2.6 of the VVSG, the guidelines say that if voter-verified paper audit trails are used, those VVPATs should be accessible - i.e. technologically capable of read-back to a blind voter from the actual paper record through an audio feed, for example. She goes on to say, incorrectly, that this technology does not exist, and implies that this part of the VVSG "kills paper ballots."

In fact, the technology does exist and has done for some time now. Ballot-marking devices (e.g. Automark) make read-back of the paper ballot a reality for any voter using this assistive device. Other vendors offer this feature as well. Not all of them do, but those that don't, should, and they are simply lagging behind. The inclusion of such a provision in 2.2.6 (or 7.9.7 in the final adopted version) can be seen as a way of holding the vendors to a higher standard, to drag them if need be, into making VVPR accessible for all.

In California, a law was passed requiring Accessible Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trails. "Accessible" in this context includes providing audio-readback to a voter with visual limitations, as in 7.9.7 of the VVSG. To date, it is unclear whether the State's certification process will allow non-accessible VVPAT, as some systems are currently configured. If so, it would be a very sad day for California, after having set a high bar for vendors to reach, to allow them to slide under it with impunity. The losers in this would be voters with disabilities, as too often has been the case. They, and we, should hold the Secretary of State's feet to the fire on this issue. And there is no reason for the rest of the country not to follow suit...

What do the grassroots say?
The author in the third part of the three-part article implies that these positions represent the grassroots. Yet thousands upon thousands of you, the grassroots, do support this common-sense legislation as the best available answer to the dilemma of far too many unauditable, unverifiable election jurisdictions across our country today. Many of you have supported legislation in your own states that is very similar to HR550. Each state that passes such provisions is better off than before, but for the nation to be better off as a whole, all states must enjoy the same bottom line -- beneath which our elections must not sink.

In 2006, 69.4 million voters will use optical scan voting systems with paper ballots. Only those in states where a manual audit is required and properly carried out can have any confidence their votes will be counted as cast.

In 2006, 66.6 million voters will use DREs on which to cast their "ballots." Only those with voter-verified paper records, in states where a manual audit is required and properly carried out, can have any confidence their votes will be counted as cast.

The bottom-line, common-sense intent of HR550 is to require voter-verified paper records, and insist on random manual audits in all the States, so that all voters can have confidence our votes will be counted as cast.